To Shining Sea - Chapter 31
The Treaty to Purchase Louisiana, May 2nd 1803
The Unveiling of Canadian History, Volume 4.
To Shining Sea – Ireland, Haiti, and Louisiana, and the Idea of a Continental Republic, 1797 – 1804.
Part 3 – The Louisiana Frontier
Chapter 31 - The Treaty to Purchase Louisiana, May 2nd 1803
The United States was urgently trying to solve the crisis of the depot at New Orleans. While President Jefferson had tried to keep it confidential (i.e. secret), news of the American possible military response (i.e. Ross’s resolutions) was seen by the French, as the negotiations began. Bonaparte got his money, George III got his war, America got Louisiana, and Saint-Domingue got its independence!
Commemorative stamp of the Louisiana Purchase of 1803.
On March 3rd, Livingston wrote to Madison that he had received his letter notifying him of Monroe’s appointment. Livingston also enclosed a copy of a letter that he had sent to Consul Bonaparte (before he had heard of Monroe’s appointment).
In his February 27th letter to the First Consul, Livingston wrote, first of all, concerning the French payment of the claims of American citizens – that the United States ‘respected the rights of foreigners and paid their contracts, with the most scrupulous exactitude, in specie’, while their own citizens are made to wait for payment of their debts from France. He warned also that:
“[Britain], ever attentive to the preservation of her interest in the United States … is, of late, very amply compensating by full payment of principal, interest, and damages, for any capture made during the war”
Next, he wrote of America’s concern about New Orleans, that:
“the change that is about to take place in the situation of Louisiana, heightened, as they are, by the silence which the Governments of France and Spain have observed, and still observe, with respect to their treaty, and the rights that the United States claim, and have long exercised, at New Orleans. I have pressed the minister to some pointed declaration on the subject of our right of depot at New Orleans, on the limits as settled with Spain, and on the navigation of the Mississippi …
The Intendant of New Orleans having thought it proper to withdraw the right of depot, secured to the citizens of the United States by the treaty of Madrid, a spirit of resentment has been manifested from one end of the Union to the other, and nothing but the interposition of the Spanish minster, the disavowal of the act by the Governor of New Orleans, and the extreme solicitude of the American Government to avoid every thing which might have a tendency to interrupt the harmony which at present so happily subsists between the United States and every power in Europe, could have prevented an immediate recurrence to arms; nor am I now without apprehensions that, if nothing is done to calm their anxiety before the season for bringing down the produce of the country occurs, the Government will be compelled to follow the impulse of the people …
That France will never derive any advantages from the colonization of New Orleans and the Floridas, is fairly to be presumed, from their having been possessed, for more than a century past, by three different nations. While the other colonies of these nations were increasing rapidly, these have always remained weak and languid, and an expensive burthen to the possessor …
I cannot, then, citizen First Consul, but express my doubt of any advantage to be derived to France from the retaining of that country in its whole extent; and I think I could show that her true interest would lead her to make such cessions out of them to the United States, as would at once afford supplies to her islands, without draining the money of France, and rivet the friendship of the United States, by removing all grounds of jealousy relative to a country of little value in itself, and which will be perpetually exposed to the attacks of her natural enemy, as well from Canada as by sea …
The savages on the east side of the Mississippi are numerous and brave; considerable sums of money are annually expended by Spain in purchasing their friendship. Should these supplies be withheld, through neglect or misapplication, a universal massacre of all the planters will ensue. Their detached situation renders it impossible to protect them …”
Livingston was warning Bonaparte about the danger of war with the United States, unless the situation at New Orleans was solved; and about the expense that would be involved in colonizing New Orleans and the Floridas, and the expense that would be required to protect the settlers from both the ‘savages’ and from the British ‘from Canada, as by sea’.
While Livingston was arguing this, in favor of the cession of the Floridas, Bonaparte (who didn’t have possession of the Floridas) could view this instead, as an argument (of the expense and of the war dangers) against the French colonization of Louisiana! And instead of the cession of the Floridas, perhaps the cession of Louisiana!!!
Talleyrand’s (March 10th) answer to this memo was that:
“it is the intention of the First Consul that this convention shall be executed, in every particular, with scrupulous exactness … you may rest assured, sir, that, upon being furnished with such a statement, every claim will be promptly and fully discharged … The First Consul … has come to the determination to send immediately to the United States a minister plenipotentiary …”
Livingston again warned Talleyrand, on March 16th, about the American deposit at the port of New Orleans, that:
“[it] must remain shut till the envoy of France shall have arrived in America, and made the necessary inquiries, and transmitted the result of those inquiries to the First Consul. In the meanwhile, all the produce of five states is left to rot upon their hands. There is only one season in which the navigation of the Mississippi is practicable. This season must necessarily pass before the envoy of France can arrive and make his report. Is it supposable, sir, that the people of the United States will tranquilly wait the progress of negotiations when the ruin of themselves and their families will be attendant on the delay? Be assured, sir, that, even were it possible that the Government of the United States could be insensible of their sufferings, they would find it as easy to prevent the Mississippi from rolling its waves into the ocean, as to control the impulse of the people to do themselves justice …”
Talleyrand answered Livingston on March 21st, that:
“I see, with pleasure, by the last letters from the French legation in the United States, that the excitement which had been raised on the subject of Louisiana has been allayed by the wisdom of your Government, and the just confidence which it inspires, to that state of tranquility which is alone proper for discussion … in announcing to me, moreover, the speedy departure of Mr. Monroe, who has been appointed a minister plenipotentiary to discuss this matter, you give me reason to conclude that your government desires that this minister should be received and heard; because every point susceptible of contradiction should be completely and definitively discussed …”
Livingston would write to Madison on March 24th to describe Talleyrand’s response, that while he was waiting for Talleyrand’s answer, that:
“unfortunately at that moment, dispatches arrived from Mr. Pichon informing them that the appointment of Mr. Monroe had tranquillized every thing & that conceiving then that they might safely wait his arrival, they determined to see whether the storm would not blow over, in which case they will treat with more advantage. They accordingly substituted for the first note which as the minster told me arranged every thing, that … which contains nothing.”
The ‘storm’ that Livingston was referring to, was the threat of war re-starting between France and Britain. On March 1st a message from the King of Britain was received by Parliament concerning the ‘distrust of the armaments in the French ports, and, in fact, preparing them for war’.
When this message was delivered to the French Government, Bonaparte issued a paper, that:
“… the expedition preparing in the Dutch ports was, as all the world knew, destined for America (for Louisiana); but, in consequence of the message, that it had been recalled and would not proceed.”
Monroe landed at Le Havre, France, on April 8th and immediately wrote to Livingston who received it on April 10th, expecting Monroe to be in Paris on the 12th.
Livingston wrote to Madison on April 12th that:
“Mr. Talleyrand asked me this day, when pressing the subject, whether we wished to have the whole of Louisiana. I told him no, that our wishes extended only to New Orleans & the Floridas …
He said that if they gave New Orleans the rest would be of little value, & that he would wish to know ‘what we would give for the whole’, I told him it was a subject I had not thought, but that I supposed we should not object to twenty millions provided our citizens were paid. He told me that this was too low an offer, that he would be glad, I would reflect upon it and tell him to morrow. I told him that as Mr. Monroe would be in town in two days, I would delay my further offer until I had the pleasure of introducing him. He added however that he did not speak from authority, but that the idea had struck him. I have reason however to think that this resolution was taken in council on Saturday. On Friday I received Mr. Ross’s motion. I immediately sent it to Mr. Talleyrand with an informal note expressive of my fears that it would be carried into effect …”
Livingston’s own reason for the change in Talleyrand’s decision – to sell Louisiana to the United States, appears to be in response to the Ross resolutions – resolutions that were inspired by General Hamilton’s February 8th letter in the New York Evening Post! General Hamilton and Ross did not get their mission to occupy New Orleans, but they were about to get Louisiana!!!
Earlier, on April 10th, First Consul Bonaparte held a meeting with Decres, minister of the navy, and Barbois, minister of finance, to announce that he was thinking of selling Louisiana to the United States for 50 million livres! Bonaparte was contemplating the inevitable, coming war with Great Britain and the need for money to finance it. And why did France need Louisiana? To supply the provisions for Saint-Domingue? But France had already lost 50,000 men there – to the fighting and to the disease of yellow fever. And Rochambeau wanted another 35,000 men! Bonaparte could not afford to lose that many more men and more money to the quagmire of a war in Saint-Domingue – that could be used in the coming war against Britain, if France would simply cut their losses in Saint-Domingue. And he knew that the first thing that Britain would do overseas, would be to seize Louisiana.
Note: Bonaparte’s sister, Pauline, arrived back in France from Saint-Domingue on January 1st 1803, and after spending several weeks in quarantine, she arrived at Paris on February 11th, along with the full story of Leclerc’s death and of the dire situation at Saint-Domingue. And at that time, it was also learned that on April 7th General Toussaint had died in his Jura prison.
Pierre Laussat had been appointed and sent by Bonaparte, as interim governor of Louisiana, to prepare the transfer of Louisiana from Spanish control to the French administrators, and arrived at New Orleans on March 26th.
But now came news that the United States was planning to invade Louisiana to seize the isle of New Orleans! And maybe ally themselves with the British, against the French! Without New Orleans, Louisiana would be worthless – while selling New Orleans and Louisiana to the Americans would keep them from becoming allies with the British. Besides, a victorious France could have all the colonies in the world that it wanted, after it had defeated Britain.
Not to be outdone however, the British ambassador, Whitworth was offering up to 2 million francs as bribes, to both Joseph and Lucien Bonaparte, as well as to Talleyrand, if they would persuade the first Consul against war and to prolong the peace!!! Talleyrand was convinced that the key to war or peace (and their continuing bribes) was Louisiana, and they argued against its cession and tried to persuade Bonaparte to change his mind.
The British, like Talleyrand, realized that Louisiana kept the Americans confined to the eastern half of the continent (and earlier plots to separate the western states from the union could be started again!), and prolonging the peace gave them more time to prepare for war. The British Empire’s plan was, in case of war with France, to seize Louisiana, and the Empire would surround the United States – from Canada, through Louisiana, to New Orleans!!!
On April 15th, Monroe and Livingston began bargaining with Marbois – the Americans offering 40 million francs and Marbois claiming that Bonaparte was demanding 100 million francs (even though Bonaparte had earlier said 50 million).
On April 29th, the Americans then ‘proposed to offer 50 million to France & 20 on account of her debt to the citizens of the United States, making 70 in the whole’. But Marbois ‘declared that he would not proceed in the negotiation on a less sum than 80 Million’. Monroe and Livingston agreed to this offer, and on May 2nd the treaty was signed.
Of the treaty, Livingston would say to Monroe and Marbois that:
“we have lived long, but this is the noblest work of our lives.”
But Bonaparte would say that:
“the sale assures forever the power of the United States, and I have given England a rival who will humble her pride.”
On May 3rd, the day after the Louisiana treaty was signed, the British ministry ordered its minister to France, Whitworth, to leave France unless France agreed to withdraw from Holland and agreed to British occupation for 10 years. The American minister in London, Rufus King, quickly wrote to Monroe and Livingston that in case of war between Britain and France, that Britain intended to send a force and to occupy New Orleans!
On May 9th, Monroe and Livingston wrote to Rufus King in London, asking him to inform the British government that in case of war, that New Orleans and Louisiana had been ceded to the United States, and that British navigation rights on the Mississippi river had been preserved.
On May 13th, Monroe and Livingston wrote to Madison and sent him the treaty and two conventions that had been concluded with the French Republic for the purchase and cession of Louisiana. They wrote that:
“before the negotiation commenced, we were apprised that the first Consul had decided to offer to the United States by sale the whole of Louisiana, & not a part of it. We found in the outset that this information was correct; so that we had to decide as a previous question whether we would treat for the whole, or jeopardize, if not abandon the hope of acquiring any part. On that point, we did not long hesitate, but proceeded to treat for the whole …
We found, however, as we advanced in the negotiation, that Mr. Marbois was absolutely restricted to the disposition of the whole; that he would treat for no less portion, and of course that it was useless to urge it. On mature consideration therefore, we finally concluded a Treaty on the best terms we could obtain for the whole.”
It was most fortunate that they didn’t hesitate long.
On May 16th, King George sent a message to parliament to announce a war with France! With the outbreak of war, Britain launched an attack on the remaining French West India colonies. The British squadron at Barbados, under Commodore Hood, forced the surrender of the French at Saint Lucia on June 22nd and at Tobago on July 1st.
In July, the British squadron at Jamaica, under Admiral Duckworth, cruised around the island of Saint-Domingue to capture any French ships, and also blockaded the ports of Cap Francois and Mole Saint Nicolas to prevent any supplies from reaching the French forces. The Saint-Domingue forces under Dessalines now attacked the French army, forcing Rochambeau to retreat from the interior back to the coast, where he faced the British navy that was bombarding the French positions.
On November 30th, having no supplies left, Rochambeau finally agreed to surrender to the British navy – the remaining 8000 French troops were sent to Jamaica and 10,000 French refugee planters were sent to Cuba. France had lost almost 50,000 troops to war and yellow fever at Saint-Domingue!
At Gonaives, Dessalines and his generals met and decided to change the name of Saint-Domingue to Haiti – the original Arawak name, and to make Dessalines governor for life.
On January 1st 1804, Haiti declared its independence from France – becoming the second republic in the Americans. Unfortunately, General Toussaint was not there to lead the reconstruction of the new nation’s economy.
[next week - chapter 32 - The News of the Louisiana Purchase, July 4th 1803]
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