To Shining Sea - Chapter 30
General Hamilton’s Response, February 8th 1803
The Unveiling of Canadian History, Volume 4.
To Shining Sea – Ireland, Haiti, and Louisiana, and the Idea of a Continental Republic, 1797 – 1804.
Part 3 – The Louisiana Frontier
Chapter 30 - General Hamilton’s Response, February 8th 1803
The debate between the ‘federalists’ and the ‘republicans’ began, over how to respond to the loss of the use of the port of New Orleans, while the Jefferson administration tried to keep their plans a secret.
Senator James Ross (Pennsylvania)
On February 8th, in the New York Evening Post, General Hamilton would answer the President’s message for the nomination of Monroe (note, that everything else was ‘confidential’) that the nation should be mobilized in case of war, before sending any envoy, that:
“since the question of Independence, none has occurred more deeply interesting to the United States than the cession of Louisiana to France. This event threatens the early dismemberment of a large portion of our country: more immediately the safety of all the Southern States; and remotely the independence of the whole union ...
The strict right to resort at once to war, if it should be deemed expedient cannot be doubted. A manifest and great danger to the nation: the nature of the cession to France, extending to ancient limits without respect to our rights by treaty; the direct infraction of an important article of the treaty itself in withholding the deposit of New-Orleans; either of these affords justifiable cause of war and that they would authorize immediate hostilities, is not to be questioned by the most scrupulous mind.
The whole is then a question of expediency. Two courses only present. First, to negotiate and endeavour to purchase, and if this fails to go to war. Secondly, to seize at once on the Floridas and New-Orleans, and then negotiate ...
To secure the better prospect of final success, the following auxiliary measures ought to be adopted. The army should be increased to ten thousand men, for the purpose of insuring the preservation of the conquest. Preparations for increasing our naval force should be made. The militia should be classed, and effectual provision made for raising on an emergency, 40,000 men. Negotiations should be pushed with Great-Britain, to induce her to hold herself in readiness to co-operate fully with us, at a moment’s warning. This plan should be adopted and proclaimed before the departure of our envoy ...”
On February 14th, Senator James Ross (Pennsylvania) rose to question the rumored allocation of two million dollars for possible bribes for the purchase of New Orleans, and stated that:
“he would not consent to go home, without making one effort, however feeble or unsuccessful, to avert the calamity which threatened the western country …
He would not say that it was unwise in this state of our affairs to prepare for remonstrance and negotiation, much less was he then about to propose any measure that would thwart negotiation, or embarrass the President. On the other hand, he was convinced that more than negotiation was absolutely necessary, that more power and more means ought to be given to the President, in order to render his negotiations efficacious …
The experience of all time has proved that with nations, as well as with individuals, submission to aggression and insult, uniformly invites a repetition and aggravation of the mischief. To repel at the onset is more easy, as well as more honorable to the injured party …
He declared it therefore to be his firm and mature opinion, that so important a right would never be secure, while the mouth of the Mississippi was exclusively in the hands of the Spaniards …
From the very position of our country, from its geographical shape, from motives of complete independence, the command of the navigation of the river ought to be in our hands …
But, sir, I have heard it suggested that another mode has been contemplated for getting rid of this crisis in our affairs. If we remain perfectly quiet and passive, show no symptoms of uneasiness or discontent; if we give no offence to the new and probable masters of the Mississippi; may be they will sell! ...
But when we have no army, no military preparations, no semblance of resistance, what would induce them to sell? Sell, sir! For how much? Why sir, although there is no information before this House, of any terms, yet I have seen it stated in the newspapers, that those who now pretend to claim that country may be persuaded to sell, by giving two million of dollars to certain influential persons about the Court …”
At this point, Wright (Maryland) said that he thought it improper to debate upon confidential information which should be kept secret. But Ross denied that there was any confidential information in the House! The Vice President, as Speaker of the Senate, ordered the galleries and lobby cleared, and the doors closed for debate, in secret session.
The next day, the House of Representatives sent a ‘confidential’ message to the Senate along with the two ‘confidential’ bills:
‘an act making further provision for the expenses attending the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations’ – to appropriate $2 million for the secret purchase of the island of New Orleans and the provinces of East and West Florida, and ‘an act for extending the external commerce of the United States’ – to appropriate $2500 dollars for the secret mission to explore the Missouri river in the Louisiana territory.
On a motion, the Senate galleries were cleared and the doors were closed again, and it was ordered, that:
“the message and the bills just received from the House of Representatives be considered as confidential, and that secrecy be observed by the members and officers of the Senate.”
On February 16th, Ross continued to state his opinions and then read his resolution - for $5 million for 50,000 troops:
“that the United States have an indisputable right to the free navigation of the river Mississippi, and to a convenient place of deposit for their produce and merchandise in the island of New Orleans,
that the late infraction of such, their unquestionable right, is an aggression hostile to their honor and interest,
that it does not consist with the dignity or safety of this Union to hold a right so important by a tenure so uncertain,
that it materially concerns such of the American citizens as dwell on the western waters, and is essential to the union, strength, and prosperity of these States, that they obtain complete security for the full and peaceable enjoyment of such their absolute right,
that the President be authorized to take immediate possession of such place or places, in the said island, or the adjacent territories, as he may deem fit and convenient for the purposes aforesaid; and to adopt such other measures for obtaining that complete security as to him in his wisdom shall seem meet,
that he be authorized to call into actual service any number of the militia of the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, or of the Mississippi Territory, which he may think proper, not exceeding fifty thousand, and to employ them, together with the military and naval forces of the Union, for effecting the objects above mentioned, [and]
that the sum of five millions of dollars be appropriated to the carrying into effect the foregoing resolutions …”
On February 22nd the Senate confidentially passed both of the confidential bills sent from the House. The bill for the appropriation of $2 million for the purchase of New Orleans and the Floridas was signed into law by the President on February 26th, and the bill for appropriation of $2,500 for the Missouri exploration was signed into law by the President on February 28th.
The next day, on February 23rd, the Senate considered Ross’s resolutions and agreed that the discussion shall be public, and also agreed that no member, during debate, shall directly or indirectly disclose the secrets of the Senate – no discussion of the $2 million appropriation or the $2500 appropriation.
Three days of lengthy debate followed, until an amendment by Breckenridge (Kentucky) to strike out everything after the word ‘resolved’ [meaning everything!?!] was agreed to (by a vote of 15 to 11), and it was unanimously agreed to new resolutions by Breckinridge that:
“whenever he (the President) shall judge it expedient, to require of the Executives of the several States to take effectual measures to arm, and equip, according to law, and hold in readiness to march, at a moment’s warning, 80,000 effective militia, officers included.”
Subsequently, ‘an act directing a detachment from the militia of the United States and for erecting certain arsenals’ was passed by the Senate on February 26th that:
“$1,500,000 be appropriated for paying and subsisting such part of the troops aforesaid, whose actual service may be wanted; for the purchase of ordnance and other military stores; and for defraying such other expenses as, during the recess of Congress, the President may deem necessary for the security of the territory of the United States …
[and] that $25,000 be appropriated for erecting, at such place or places on the western waters, as the President may judge most proper, one or more arsenals; and that the President cause the same to be furnished with such arms, ammunition and military stores as he may deem necessary.”
This bill was promptly sent to the House, was passed, and on March 3rd was signed into law by the President.
Ross didn’t get the $5 million that he proposed for defence, but the ‘republicans’ did appropriate $1.5 million - to be used at the sole discretion of the President; and instead of Ross’s proposed 50,000 militia, the ‘republicans’ were panicked into mobilizing 80,000 militia - again at the discretion of the President! Because Ross was a ‘federalist’ from Pittsburgh, the ‘republicans’ did not want to be seen as less concerned about the western states than the ‘federalists’.
On March 2nd, Madison issued his instructions to Monroe and Livingston that:
“the object in view is to procure by just and satisfactory arrangements, a Cession to the United States, of New Orleans, and of West and East Florida, or as much thereof as the actual proprietor can be prevailed on to part with … [and] to seek by just means the establishment of the Mississippi down to its mouth as their boundary …
On the supposition that the French Government does not mean to force, or to court war with the United States; but on the contrary, that it sees the interest which France has in cultivating their neutrality and amity, the dangers to so desirable a relation between the two countries which lurk under a neighbourhood modified as is that of Spain at present, must have great weight in recommending the change which you will have to propose …”
Madison also included a plan for a draft treaty, that included ‘the pecuniary consideration to be offered for the territories’ -
“the President has made up his mind to go as far as fifty millions of livres tournois, rather than lose the main object.”
The payment however would also take into consideration ‘the payment of claims which have been or may be acknowledged by the French Republic to be due to American citizens’.
On March 7th, Monroe wrote to President Jefferson that he had received his instructions from Madison and that:
“the resolutions of Mr. Ross prove that the federal party will stick at nothing to embarrass the administration and recover its lost power. They nevertheless produce a great effect on the public mind and I presume more especially in the western country …
The consequences of a disappointment are not easily calculated. If it restored the federal party to power and involved us in war, the result might be fatal. It therefore highly merits consideration whether we should not take that ground as the ultimatum in the negotiation which must in every possible event preserve the confidence & affection of the western people. While we stand well with them, we shall prosper. We shall be most apt to avoid war, taking ten years ensuing together; and if we are driven by necessity into it, it is much better that it be under the auspices of a republican than a monarchic administration.”
It should be noted that Monroe did not rule out the issue of war, he simply (and honestly) stated that if there was to be war, it should be under a ‘republican’ government and not a ‘federalist’ one. He was more worried of losing the votes of the western states and thus of losing power than of a war. This confirms General Hamilton’s opinion of the ‘republicans’, and why he disagreed passionately with their ‘Jacobin’ ideology.
Note: But Hamilton never doubted their patriotism or would call them traitors. This can be seen in the question of Jefferson or Burr for president. While General Hamilton greatly disagreed with and distrusted Jefferson, he found him infinitely preferable to Burr. This could also be seen among the ‘republicans’ – when a dinner was held on the eve of Monroe’s departure from Washington City, and every ‘republican’ congressman and senator attended, along with Pichon and Yrujo, but Burr was not invited!!!
On March 9th, James Monroe left New York City to travel to France as the Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States.
On March 10th, Madison again wrote to the Spanish minister, Yrujo, that:
“the latest information from New Orleans makes it certain that altho’ your letters to the Governor & the Intendant of Louisiana had been received, the Edict of the latter against our right of deposit had not been rescinded … [and] the season is arrived when the stipulated outlet for the produce of the Western Citizens of the United States [is] essential …”
Yrujo replied later that day that he now declares most positively that Morales’s proclamation was a personal decision made without royal sanction or knowledge … Neither one (Morales and Salcedo) disputes the right of citizens of the western states to a place of deposit on the Spanish banks of the Mississippi, but Morales thinks it incumbent on him to suspend the deposit as the three-year term allowed by treaty has expired and much prejudice to the royal interests has been experienced from the deposit in the city … Morales did not venture to assign an equivalent location, because he believed such an act exceeded his authority.
On March 11th, Yrujo would write to Morales that the U.S. government was doing its utmost to prevent Americans from attacking Spanish territory in response to the illegal closure of the deposit and ordered Morales to reopen the deposit or designate another location for it immediately, lest he be responsible for the loss of the Floridas and Louisiana. And he would write to Salcedo that Morales must revoke his decree if the territory was to be preserved.
[next week - chapter 31 - The Treaty to Purchase Louisiana, May 2nd 1803]
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