To Shining Sea - Chapter 27
Livingston’s Memoir concerning Louisiana, August 10th 1802
The Unveiling of Canadian History, Volume 4.
To Shining Sea – Ireland, Haiti, and Louisiana, and the Idea of a Continental Republic, 1797 – 1804.
Part 3 – The Louisiana Frontier
Chapter 27 - Livingston’s Memoir concerning Louisiana, August 10th 1802
President Jefferson would begin his political dance with Bonaparte and Talleyrand, attempting to lure France into ceding its newly-acquired Ile d’Orleans [New Orleans] to the United States, in order for them to remain best friends forever - while threatening that somehow the United States would be drawn toward an alliance with their dreaded enemy, Britain. But what Jefferson really wanted was the Floridas!
Robert Livingston, by Gilbert Stuart
Robert Livingston, the American minister to France, arrived at Paris and presented himself to Talleyrand and Bonaparte on December 6th – a week before Leclerc’s expedition departed for Saint-Domingue.
On December 10th, Livingston wrote to Madison that:
“I found from a variety of sources here, and some I think I can depend on, the business of Louisiana had been concluded and it was understood it had been given in exchange for the Spanish part of St. Domingo to be restored to its old master. Several circumstances concurred to induce me to believe this report was not void of truth. I therefore took the earliest opportunity to touch upon that subject with the minister (Talleyrand) and to hint at the reasons of policy (as it respected the French government as well as ourselves) that made the object interesting to us. He seemed at first inclined to wave the subject but when he found I pressed more closely he admitted that it had been a subject of conversation but that nothing had been concluded or even resolved on in the affair. I left him with a hint that perhaps both France and Spain might find a mutual interest in ceding the Floridas to the United States …”
On January 13th 1802, Livingston sent Madison a copy of the treaty that ceded Louisiana to France, and wrote that:
“my former letters left you little doubt on the subject of the cession of Louisiana, by the enclosed copy of the late treaty between France & Spain you will find that it is a transaction of pretty long standing. The absence of the minister (Talleyrand), prevents my applying to him for the former treaty, which he will hardly know how to give me after absolutely denying that any had been formed on the subject. By the secrecy and duplicity practised, relative to this object, it is clear to me that they apprehend some opposition on the part of America, to their plans.”
On March 26th, Madison replied to Livingston that he had received his letter with the copy of the treaty, but that on March 24th:
“the copy of the Treaty between France and Spain had been republished, as you will find, in the National Intelligencer of this city, from a Paris Gazette [from the Journal des Debats of Paris, January 17th].”
However, Madison continued that:
“the date of this instrument with some verbal accounts from Spain, leave it possible yet, that the Cession of Louisiana may have been suspended, if not revoked, by some subsequent transaction between the parties; to say nothing of the language held to you on that subject by the French Minister of Foreign relations. The appearance in the Paris papers of the Treaty above referred to, will lead, no doubt, to further conversations in which it will be difficult to avoid a disclosure of the real state of the matter.”
On April 18th, President Jefferson sent Pierre Du Pont to France with a letter for Livingston (Du Pont was allowed to read the letter before sealing it) that:
“there is on the globe one single spot, the possessor of which is our natural & habitual enemy. It is New Orleans, through which the produce of three eighths of our territory must pass to market, and from its fertility it will ere long yield more than half of our whole produce and contain more than half our inhabitants. France placing herself in that door assumes to us the attitude of defiance … the day that France takes possession of New Orleans fixes the sentence which is to restrain her forever within her low water mark … from that moment we must marry ourselves to the British fleet & nation …
This is not a state of things we seek or desire. It is one which this measure, if adopted by France, forces on us, as necessarily as any other cause, by the laws of nature, brings on it’s necessary effect … she may say she needs Louisiana for the supply of her West Indies. She does not need it in time of peace, and in war she could not depend on them because they would be so easily intercepted. I should suppose that all these considerations might in some proper form be brought into view of the government of France.
Tho’ stated by us, it ought not to give offence; because we do not bring them forward as a menace, but as consequences not controllable by us, but inevitable from the course of things. We mention them not as things which we desire by any means, but as things we deprecate; and we beseech a friend to look forward and to prevent them for our common interests …
If France considers Louisiana however as indispensable for her views, she might perhaps be willing to look about for arrangements which might reconcile it to our interests. If any thing could do this, it would be the ceding to us the island of New Orleans and the Floridas. This would certainly in a great degree remove the causes of jarring & irritation between us, and perhaps for such a length of time as might produce other means of making the measure permanently conciliatory to our interests & friendships …
The idea here is that the troops sent to St. Domingo, were to proceed to Louisiana after finishing their work in that island. If this were the arrangement, it will give you time to return again & again to the charge. For the conquest of St. Domingo will not be a short work. It will take considerable time and wear down a great number of soldiers. Every eye in the US. is now fixed on this affair of Louisiana …”
Madison wrote again to Livingston on May 5th that:
“no hope remains but from the accumulating difficulties of going thro’ with the undertaking, and from the conviction you may be able to impress, that it must have an instant and powerful effect in changing the relations between France and the United States …
If a possession of the mouth of the Mississippi is to be added to other causes of discord, the worst events are to be apprehended. You will consequently spare no efforts that will consist with prudence and dignity, to lead the Councils of France to proper views of this subject, and to an abandonment of her present purpose. You will also pursue by prudent means the enquiry into the extent of the Cession, particularly whether it includes the Floridas as well as New Orleans; and endeavour to ascertain the price at which these, if included in the Cession, would be yielded to the United States ...”
Perhaps this was one of the ulterior reasons for the peace between Britain and France – the intention of the British Empire to stop the expansion of the United States, first at the Appalachian mountains, and then at the Mississippi river? However, it is apparent that Jefferson’s intent was not to acquire Louisiana, but simply to, at least, acquire the east bank of the Mississippi in West Florida – to ensure the free navigation of the Mississippi river for the United States – while the intention of the British Empire would inevitably lead into a second war for independence, in 1812!!!
In June 1802, an article appeared in the Gazette de France, that perhaps best showed the thinking of Talleyrand, complaining that Leclerc’s army had found guns and ammunition in American ships which were intended for General Toussaint’s army [this had been true prior to the ratification of the Convention]. The Gazette suggested that this showed that it was the ambition of the United States ‘to rule over the new world and to place under its yoke all the West-India colonies.’ Therefore ‘France’s acquisition of Louisiana would create an impenetrable barrier to American expansion’ and be a ‘counterpoise to the domination of the United States.’
In a letter to Livingston, July 6th 1802, Madison tried to disprove Pichon’s ‘charge against this country of supplying or attempting to supply the party of Toussaint with the implements of war’, writing that:
“With respect to supplies of military articles to the party of Toussaint, the answer is obvious and must be satisfactory. Without admitting the fact that any such articles were at any time so supplied, it may be observed that the French Government can have no desire to recur to past periods as criteria of present dispositions; and that it is the duty and the interest of both countries not to remove the veil which the reconciliation so happily concluded, has thrown over preceding occurrences. The conduct of the American Administration since that event cannot be even suspected of the slightest irregularity or unfriendliness on this subject; nor, as is believed, has a single instance happened since the arrival of the French armament, and the regulations by General LeClerc, adapted to the revolt which ensued, in which an American citizen has engaged in commerce of any sort, with Toussaint or his adherents. The precautions taken by the French Commanders were a sufficient bar to such an attempt; and had it been otherwise, it was explicitly declared to the French Minister here and to Admiral Villaret, as you will have seen by communications already made to you, that our offending citizens would be considered by the President as fairly subjected to the penalties of their illegal conduct.”
On July 30th, after receiving the despatches both from President Jefferson and from Madison, Livingston answered that:
“I was now very much engaged in preparing a lengthy memoir on the subject of the mutual interest of France and the United States, relative to Louisiana, by which I hope to convince them that, both in a commercial and a political view, the possession of it would be disadvantageous to France … In the present state of things, until the point is settled, I think it probable the expedition to Louisiana will be postponed. In the mean time, all that can be done here will be to endeavor to obtain a cession of New Orleans, either by purchase, or by offering to make it a port of entry to France, on such terms as shall promise advantages to her commerce, and give her hopes of introducing her manufactures and wines into our western country …”
On August 10th, Livingston wrote to Madison that:
“I have had several conferences on the subject of Louisiana – but can get nothing more from them than I have already communicated … I have written the enclosed essay which I have had translated and struck off 20 copies ... I have placed some of them in such hands as I think will best serve our purposes. Talleyrand has promised to give it an attentive perusal after which when I find how it works, I will come forward with some proposition. I am very much however at a loss as to what terms you would consider it as allowable to offer if they can be brought to a sale of the Floridas either with or without New Orleans – which last place will be of little consequence if we possess the Floridas because a much better passage may be formed on the east side of the river. I may perhaps carry my estimate of them too high but when I consider first the expense it will save us in guards and garrisons, the risk of war, the value of duties and what may be raised by the sale of lands I should think them a cheap purchase at twenty millions of dollars.”
His memoir tried to disprove ‘Whether it will be advantageous to France to take possession of Louisiana?’:
– “it will readily be admitted that transmarine colonies add nothing to the strength of a nation” [?!?]
– “experience has proved that the inhabitants of warm climates are never led by their necessities to labor. Force alone can supply those taskmasters (cold and hunger) which nature has placed under northern skies. Hence the necessity of slaves in rendering the West Indies productive.” [?!?]
– “persons that settle in remote and unhealthy climates seldom possess much. (Capital) must, then, be drawn either from France, or from some other country that possess superfluous capital. If drawn from France, it must, to a certain degree, injure the manufactures of France at home.” [?!?]
– “commodities, not raised in the islands, and which might be found in Louisiana, are only wood, and, perhaps, rice; but it is certain that these productions, when attended with the expense of procuring them in a warm and unhealthy climate, will not compensate the expense, or, at least, furnish the same profit to labor that might be obtained, were it employed, as in the islands, in raising more valuable commodities.” [?!?]
– “experience has evinced that no two nations can border upon each other, without having the spirit of rivalry excited … will endeavor to anticipate the hostilities it dreads; it will recriminate; and the nations will be plunged into a war before explanations can take place. If there is a situation in the world that would lead to these melancholy consequences, it would be that of France in possession of New Orleans.” [?!?]
He then goes on to reiterate the threats of Jefferson and Madison, that:
“the resentments of the people will be sharpened against each other; the ties of friendship will be broken, and the Government of the United States, which always partakes of the feelings of the people, will find itself unavoidably placed in such a situation as to change its connexion, and to guard against the hostility of its old ally, by forming cautionary connexions with Britain, who will court their alliance and stimulate their resentments against France; because by this connexion she will hope to retain the commerce of America, which she almost exclusively possesses, give security to her colonies, and, in case of war, facilitate her attempts to conquer the French islands; and, above all, prevent that commercial and maritime union between France and the United States, on which alone France can hope to engraft a naval superiority.
It may be asked why these jealousies, that appear so greatly to apprehend with respect to France, do not prevail with respect to Britain in possession of Canada. First, because Britain has, very prudently, separated her territory by a natural boundary, which keeps the inhabitants of the respective nations from coming into contact … Second, because the natural export of the United States being by their own rivers, there is no communication of any moment between them and Canada; but thirdly, because Upper Canada is principally settled by emigrants from the United States, who, in case of a rupture, would probably join them if the spirit of the American Government did not prohibit an extension of their limits.
And, after all, what advantages, political or commercial, can France obtain by the possession of New Orleans and the east side of the Mississippi, that can compensate for the losses she will sustain in both respects, by placing herself in a state of rivalry with the United States? …
The cession of Louisiana is, however, very important to France if she avails herself of it in the only way that sound policy would dictate … Since, by this cession, she may acquire a right to navigate the Mississippi, and a free trade; and if she knows how to avail herself of this circumstance by a perfect understanding with the United States, she will find a vent through it for a vast variety of her commodities …
These objects can only be obtained by a cession of New Orleans to the United States, with a reservation of a right of entry, at all times, free of any other duties than such as are exacted from the vessels of the United States; together with a right to navigate the Mississippi. This will give her ships an advantage over those of every other nation, will retain and increase the capital of New Orleans, from which her supplies for her islands will be purchased on the easiest terms, will carry the fabrics of France into all the Western territory, which the United States will have no interest in checking, as all rivalry between the two nations would then be removed.
France will then command the respect, without exciting the fear of the two nations whose friendship is most important to her commerce, and to the preservation of her islands; and all this without the expense of establishments that would drain the national treasury, and divert the national capital from its proper objects; while, on the other hand, should France retain New Orleans, and endeavor to colonize Louisiana, she will render herself an object of jealousy to Spain, the United States, and Britain, who will not only discourage her commerce, but compel her to make expensive establishments for the security of her rights.”
To men like Talleyrand and Bonaparte, it must have seemed like a very timid threat by the Americans – that they would contemplate an alliance with their hated enemy (Britain) and sever relations with their dear friend (France). But it did show their great desire to somehow acquire New Orleans - or at least West Florida – to gain possession of the east bank of the Mississippi at its mouth, and that if France could arrange this, then all their troubles would immediately disappear.
On October 24th, Livingston wrote to President Jefferson that he had a conversation with Joseph Bonaparte, that:
“having put into his hands a copy of the memoir on Louisiana … I then asked him whether he had read my notes on Louisiana. He told me he had & that he had conversed upon the subject with the first Consul, who he found had read them with attention, that his brother had told him that he had nothing more at heart than to be upon the best terms with the U.S. … Wishing to know with certainty whether the Floridas were excluded (which however I had pretty well ascertained before), I told him that the only causes of difference that might arise between us being the debt and Louisiana. I conceived that both might be happily & easily removed by making an exchange with Spain & returning them Louisiana retaining New Orleans & giving the latter & the Floridas for our debt.”
Livingston was referring to the debt that France owed to the United States for spoliation claims according to the Convention. President Jefferson estimated that it ‘will be a considerable sum, several millions’.
Livingston continued in his report to President Jefferson that:
“He asked me whether we should prefer the Floridas to Louisiana. I told him that there was no comparison in their value but that we had no wish to extend our boundary across the Mississippi or give colour to the doubts that had been entertained of the moderation of our views. That all we sought was our security & not an extension of territory. He replied that he believed any new cession on the part of Spain would be extremely difficult that Spain had parted with Trinidad and Louisiana with great reluctance.”
[next week - chapter 28 - The Closing of the Port of New Orleans, October 16th 1802]
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