To Shining Sea - Chapter 22
The Ratification of the Convention with France, February 3rd 1801
The Unveiling of Canadian History, Volume 4.
To Shining Sea – Ireland, Haiti, and Louisiana, and the Idea of a Continental Republic, 1797 – 1804.
Part 2 – The Haitian Frontier
Chapter 22 - The Ratification of the Convention with France, February 3rd 1801
With the incoming (pro-French) Jefferson administration, and with the recent French army’s military victories, the French government was not willing to make any compromises to secure a treaty with the United States. When a ‘Convention’ was reached, Alexander Hamilton organized the ‘federalists’ to support it, as it would be the best that could be gotten, and would keep the United States out of European entanglements.
Joseph Napoleon, French Commission President
The American commissioners, Ellsworth and Davies, finally arrived at Paris on March 2nd, where they met Murray who had arrived on March 1st. On March 5th, First Consul Bonaparte appointed his three-man commission – his brother, Joseph Bonaparte (commission president), along with Pierre-Louis Roederer and Charles-Pierre Fleurieu (members of the council of state), with Louis-Andre Pichon as the commission secretary, and on March 8th, the three American commissioners were received by Consul Bonaparte and his three commissioners.
On April 2nd, the two commissions held their first negotiating session at the chateau of Joseph Bonaparte. The American commissioners had been instructed that compensation for the losses of her citizens at the hands of French vessels or agents was ‘an indispensable condition of the treaty’ and that after these claims ‘shall be duly attended to … you may then turn your thoughts to the regulation of navigation and commerce’; and that these treaties, that had been suspended by Congress, ‘be not in whole or in part revived by the new treaty’.
These suspended treaties were the two treaties signed in 1778 – the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, and the Treaty of Alliance.
The French commissioners had been instructed (by Talleyrand) to re-establish the treaties as before, and to demand a revision so that France could enjoy the same advantages that had been accorded to Britain by Jay’s Treaty; and that the issue of compensation was to be set aside until a new treaty was made. They took the position that the United States could claim compensation only on the basis of the old treaties – if it wished to annul those treaties, it must abandon all claims based on them! The negotiations made little progress and were suspended until the French commissioners could receive further instructions from the First Consul.
But Bonaparte was not in Paris – he had left on April 6th with an army to march to northwestern Italy, to stop the advance of the Austrian army which was besieging the French at Genoa. After defeating the Austrian army at the battle of Marengo on June 14th, and after signing a cease-fire agreement on June 15th (the Convention of Alessandria), Bonaparte returned to Paris on July 2nd, and the negotiations with the commissioners were then resumed on July 11th.
Also arriving was news of a remarkable change in United States – the disbanding of the Provisional Army, the dismissal of Secretary of State Pickering and his replacement with John Marshall, the New York election results and the prospect that Jefferson might become the next American president.
Talleyrand reported to Bonaparte that:
“his [i.e. Jefferson] accession should bring the United States back to us, but we should not forget that we have improved our position by moderation and by complete non-intervention in their internal affairs. We can make Mr. Jefferson’s administration effective only by proving that we do not desire to abuse his partiality for us and by renouncing the expectations of sacrifice and condescension which would give his policy a character it should not be allowed to assume. Mr. Jefferson will consider it a duty to unite all true Americans and to resume with full force the system of balance between France and England which alone is wise for the United States. This policy accords best with our own interests. We have nothing to desire in the United States except to see them prosper. Without agitation, without intrigue, jealousy of England and her demands will lead to a rapprochement with us ...”
The American commissioners reported that:
“it was the decided opinion of the Premier Consul that the ancient treaties ought to be the basis of negotiation; that the compensation could only be a consequence of the existence of the treaties, and the re-establishment under them of the former privileges and relations; and that he would never consent to make a treaty which would surrender the exclusive rights of France, in favor of an enemy; or, in any event, make a treaty with the United States, which would not place France on a footing of equality at least with Great Britain.”
On July 23rd, the Americans then made a proposal:
“to the effect that the payment of the indemnities should be suspended until the Government of the United States should have offered to France an article, re-establishing her in the exclusive privileges she claimed, under the treaty of 1778” … “stipulating free admission into the ports of each for the privateers and prizes of the other, and the exclusion of those of their enemies.”
The French commissioners again answered:
“either the ancient treaties, carrying with them the privileges resulting from anteriority, together with stipulations for reciprocal indemnity; or a new treaty, promising equality, unattended with indemnities.”
The American ministers would write to Marshall, on August 15th, that:
“it has, however, become manifest, that the negotiation must be abandoned, or our instructions deviated from. Should the latter be ventured upon, which, from present appearances, is not improbable, the deviation will be no greater than a change of circumstances may be presumed to justify. The success of the French in Italy has produced an armistice and has since opened with the Emperor a negotiation for peace which is still pending. The result is daily and anxiously expected.”
On August 20th, the American commissioners made another proposal, that:
“let it be declared that the former treaties are renewed and confirmed, and shall have the same effect as if no misunderstanding between the two Powers had intervened … [that] the articles of commerce and navigation, except the seventeenth article of the treaty, shall admit of modification … [and that] there shall be a reciprocal stipulation for indemnities.”
The French commissioners replied, since the Americans proposed an important modification, that:
“this consisted in offering a new treaty without indemnity.”
They then proposed that:
“if, in the space of seven years, the seventeenth and twenty-second articles shall not be offered and accepted in their original force, the indemnities awarded by the commissioners shall not be paid – [meaning, to] leave it optional with France to reject indemnities, while they secure to her, unconditionally, the treaty of commerce, with a minute exception, which is so limited by time and other circumstances as to render it of little consideration with either party” [!?!]
Although the position of the French commissioners continued to be that France would refuse to pay indemnities to the Americans without ‘a full and entire recognition of the treaties’, their real purpose was to avoid paying any indemnities whatsoever.
The American commissioners reported that at a conference on September 12th, that:
[the French commissioners] “now openly avowed that their real object was to avoid, by every means, any engagement to pay indemnities, giving as one reason the utter inability of France to pay, in the situation in which she would be left by the present war.” [!!!]
They further wrote that:
“the American ministers being now convinced that the door was perfectly closed against all hope of obtaining indemnities, with any modification of the treaties, it only remained to be determined whether, under all circumstances, it would not be expedient to attempt a temporary arrangement which would extricate the United States from the war, or that peculiar state of hostility in which they are at present involved, save the immense property of our citizens now depending before the council of prizes, and secure, as far as possible, our commerce against the abuses of captures during the present war.”
On September 13th, ‘after mature deliberation’ the American ministers then resolved to make one last proposal that:
“the ministers plenipotentiary of the respective parties, not being at present to agree respecting the former treaties and indemnities, the parties will in due and convenient time further treat on these subjects; and, until they shall have agreed respecting the same, the said treaties shall have no operation.”
This was agreeable to the French commissioners, and that:
“it was agreed to meet from day to day until the business was finished.”
A provisional treaty was agreed to on September 30th, and it was revised – instead, called a ‘Convention’ – and was signed by both sides on October 3rd.
On October 16th, the commissioners would send a despatch to Secretary of State, Marshall, outlining their negotiations and also:
“to present to you a journal of their proceedings, and a convention in which those proceedings have terminated.”
Ellsworth also wrote to Hamilton that:
“I enclose for your perusal, but by no means for publication, an extract of a letter I have just been writing for the Secretary of State. More could not be done than has been, without too great a sacrifice; and I hope, as a reign of Jacobinism in France is over, and appearances are strong in favour of a general peace, that you will think it was better to sign a Convention than to do nothing.”
After the signing, Murray returned to The Hague (as the American Minster to the Netherlands), while Ellsworth, who was ‘not in any condition to undertake a voyage to America at this late season of the year’ sailed to Britain and spent the winter at Bath, and while Davies sailed for United States – with the Convention.
“The Convention with France, having been published at Paris, immediately found its way into the English newspapers, in which it appeared the day after Mr. Ellsworth’s arrival in London.’’ [Letter of Rufus King to John Marshall, October 31st 1800]
King also reported that after conversing with some of the British ministers, Lord Grenville said that:
“he saw nothing in the convention inconsistent with the treaty between them and us, or which afforded them any ground of complaint.”
In the United States, although rumors had appeared that the negotiations had been suspended, a first report that an agreement had been reached, appeared in a Baltimore paper on November 7th, but details of the agreement would have to await the arrival of Davies at Philadelphia on December 13th – 10 days after the end of the presidential election!
Then on December 15th, President Adams would send the Convention to the Senate, along with the 3 manuscript volumes containing the journals of the envoys, and would later send to the Senate, his prior instructions to the commissioners.
And now, at this same time, when discussions were to begin regarding the provisional treaty with France, discussions were also being held concerning the outcome of the states’ electoral voting – and the probable tie between Jefferson and Burr. But, support for the Convention would come from ‘republicans’, not from ‘federalists’!
On December 17th, Harrison Otis wrote to Hamilton, for advice about the tie in electoral votes between Jefferson and Burr, but he also wrote about the treaty with France that was now before the Senate, that:
“I believe will be found another chapter in the book of humiliation. All claims for spoliation, it is said, are suspended during the war [i.e. Article 2], all public ships captured by each party are to be surrendered [i.e. Article 3], … it is very doubtful in my mind whether the Senate ratify.”
Hamilton would also receive similar letters (regarding both Jefferson and Burr, and the treaty with France) from Theodore Sedgwick on December 17th, from James Gunn on December 18th, and from Gouverneur Morris on December 19th.
On December 22nd, Hamilton responded to Sedgwick that:
“I am of opinion the Treaty must be ratified. The contrary conduct would I think utterly ruin the Federal party and endanger our internal tranquillity. Moreover it is better to close the thing where it is than leave it to a Jacobin Administration to do much worse … At the same time I wish it to be declared by our friends in the Senate that they think the treaty liable to strong objections & pregnant with dangers in the interests of this country; but having been negotiated, they will not withhold their assent.”
On January 6th 1801, the Senate began consideration of the provisional treaty with France – the ‘Convention’.
On the 8th, they voted on whether to consent to Article 2, nays 16 to yeas 11 – but it was not enough for a 2/3 majority to expunge it; and on whether to consent to Article 3, nays 15 to yeas 12 – again, it was not enough for a 2/3 majority to expunge it.
The next day, the Senate unanimously voted, yeas 27 to nays 0, on the adoption of an additional article – that:
“nothing in this treaty contained, shall be construed or operate contrary to former and existing treaties with other states or sovereigns”,
and on the 12th, they voted, yeas 25 to nays 1, on adoption of a second additional article – that:
“the present convention shall be in full force for a term not exceeding __ years.”
The ‘federalists’ saw that by this convention, it was certain that France would never indemnify the United States citizens for their losses, and that a mere mention of the former treaties would recognize their continued existence.
On January 10th, Hamilton again wrote to Morris that:
“I continue of the opinion that it is best upon the whole to ratify it unconditionally … It does not appear to me that on fair construction the existence of the old treaties is recognised …
The indemnification for spoliations is, I admit, virtually relinquished as the price of a waver of the treaties; but considering our situation and the immense and growing power of France, that price is not too great …
With this view of the subject I do not consider the objections to a simple ratification to be strong enough to countervail the dangers of a qualified one which certainly will leave it in the option of the other party to recede. It is possible that in the pride of success our backwardness to ratify may be the pretext of a rupture to punish the presumption. Under existing circumstances such an event would be disastrous – if not for the evils which the arms of France might inflict yet for the hazard of internal schism and discord. The mania for France has in a great degree revived in our country and the party which should invoke a rupture would be likely to be ruined … If the present Convention be ratified our relations with France will have received a precise shape. To take up the subject anew and mould it into shape better according with Jacobin projects will not be easy, as finding the whole business open to give it that shape. I think it politic therefore to close as far as we can …
Again, it will be of consequence to the federal cause in future to be able to say – the Federal Administration steered the vessel through all the storms raised by the contentions of Europe into a peaceable and safe port. This cannot be said if the contest with France continues open …”
Here, Hamilton was repeating the ‘Proclamation of Neutrality’ policy of President Washington in his great Farewell Address to the nation’s citizens – to preserve America’s independence by steering clear of involvement in European wars and conflicts. While President Adams sought ratification of the Convention for his ambition and as a mark of his legacy as president, Hamilton became the strongest advocate for consenting to ratification because it was in the best interest of the young nation.
And, while Jefferson and Burr both sought to become president to satisfy their ambitions, Hamilton voiced his support for Jefferson because, again, it was in the best interest of the nation. While Jefferson and Adams had huge egos to satiate, unlike those two, Hamilton did not let any prior grudges or prejudices determine his words and actions for his country.
First, on January 15th, the Senate again considered the treaty – voting to consent to Article 2, nays 15 to yeas 10; voting to consent to Article 3, nays 16 to yeas 13; voting unanimously on the 1st additional article, yeas 28 to nays 0; and voting unanimously on the 2nd additional article (for a term not exceeding 8 years), yeas 28 to nays 0.
On January 23rd, the Senate heard the report of the committee (appointed to reduce the several votes on the convention made on behalf of the United States with the republic of France, into the form of a ratification) – that they do consent to and advice the ratification of the convention … Provided, that the second and third articles be expunged and that two additional articles be added.
Second, the Senate then voted to expunge Article 2, Yeas 17 to Nays 13 (but not 2/3); voted to expunge Article 3, Yeas 16 to Nays 17 (but not 2/3); voted for the 1st addition, Yeas 17 to Nays 13 (but not 2/3); and voted for the 2nd addition, Yeas 29 to Nays 6 (that was 2/3).
Finally, on whether to agree to the resolution of the committee, the Senate voted Yeas 16 and Nays 14 – not enough to consent to ratification of the Convention.
After discussions and negotiations between the ‘republicans’ and the ‘federalists’, a compromise was reached. On February 3rd, the previous vote was re-considered, and the Senate voted to expunge Article 2, Yeas 30 to Nays 1 (2/3 agreeing); and voted to expunge Article 3, Yeas 18 to Nays 13 (2/3 not agreeing).
The Senate then voted again on a resolution to ratify the Convention – provided that the 2nd article be expunged and, in an additional article, that it be in force for 8 years, Yeas 22 to Nays 9!!! The Senate had ratified the Convention with France and it now had to be sent back to France, for the First Consul to agree with the amendments.
The Senate ratification was done in time for the results of the Electoral College votes to be opened by the Senate the following week on February11th.
After the Senate had consented to the Convention, the act suspending commercial intercourse with France was allowed to expire, and the brig, Herald, was sent to the West Indies with orders to recall the U.S. Navy fleet.
On March 3rd, his last day in office, President Adams signed into law an act for a Naval Peace Establishment, that authorized the President to sell any or all of the Navy’s ships and vessels – except the 13 frigates that were to be retained, and to lay up the frigates – except for 6 of them that were to be kept in constant service, in time of peace. Of the Navy’s 34 ships, the 13 frigates and 1 schooner were retained and the rest were sold off. President Jefferson would send three frigates – the President, the Philadelphia and the Essex, and the schooner, the Enterprise, to the Barbary coast, where the Bashaw of Tripoli had declared war against the United States, unless the tribute paid to him was increased.
Note: One year later, a similar act would be passed to reduce the size of the Army to 2 infantry regiments, 1 artillery regiment and a corps of engineers, reducing it from its projected force of 5,438 men to 3,289 – that was roughly its current actual size.
President Jefferson would waste little time in dealing with the ratification of the Convention with France.
On February 24th 1801 (a week after the House of Representatives voted to elect him as president) Jefferson wrote to Robert Livingston, asking him:
“[if] you might be willing to undertake the mission as minister plenipotentiary to France … the time period of your departure cannot be settled til we get our administration together, and may perhaps be delayed til we receive the ratification of the treaty which would probably be 4 months, consequently the commission would not be made out til then.”
A week before Livingston would receive the letter and agree to the mission, President Jefferson sent the nomination of Livingston to the Senate on March 5th (on his 2nd day in office) and it was quickly approved.
On March 18th, Levi Lincoln (on behalf of Jefferson) wrote to Oliver Ellsworth and William Vans Murray that:
“[the Senate had] advised and consented to the ratification of it with the suppression of the 2nd article, and the addition of an article limiting its duration. The term of change in the Administration being then approaching, this matter has rested to the present moment. Tho’ the day agreed on for the exchange of ratifications will from these unavoidable causes have passed over, yet we apprehend that that exchange, being only a matter of form, will suffer no difficulty, and then it will take place on your receipt of this as a matter of course, if the modifications of the Senate meet no objection as we hope they will not … The honorable Mr. Dawson, member of the late Congress from the state of Virginia, will deliver you this with the treaty which is committed to his care.”
On March 28th, President Jefferson would again write to Livingston that:
“with respect to the time of your departure, it will depend on the return of Mr. Dawson with the ratification of the convention.”
John Dawson left the United States on March 31st and arrived at Paris on May 13th. Since Ellsworth had already left Britain to return to the United States, Murray was now the sole person appointed to negotiate with the French commissioners, and he left The Hague to return to Paris, arriving on May 28th and meeting Bonaparte on June 6th.
[next week - Part 3 - The Louisiana Frontier - chapter 23 - President Jefferson’s new policy with France, July 1801]
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