The Blip Report for Tuesday, April 2nd 2024
Taiwan and the opium war - part 10
Chiang in Moscow?
Chiang had told Dr. Sun that he might stay in Russia for 5 or 10 years to study, but then after a mere three months, of meetings with Trotsky and of observing the operations of the Cheka, his departure from Moscow was ‘predictably sudden and unexpected’.
Chiang claimed that he had returned so that he might be of immediate service to Dr. Sun, however, when he arrived back in Shanghai, he didn’t report to Dr. Sun, but instead went home to Chekiang.
“Chiang had probably calculated that the unique experience and knowledge he had acquired on his mission to Russia had made him indispensable to the Kuomintang, and he was stubborn and extreme enough to make use of this fact to strengthen his position within the party before agreeing to proceed to Canton.” [The Early Chiang Kai-shek, by Pichon Loh, pg. 89]
Knowing that Dr. Sun was ‘ever in need of qualified military personnel’ and was wishing to have first-hand information of what was happening in Russia, Chiang remained at home for a whole month, and only after being promised that he would head the new military academy would Chiang finally go to see Dr. Sun ‘to report all matters and make plans for Sino-Soviet cooperation’.
Chiang arrived in Guangdong just in time for the Kuomintang’s First National Congress, where Dr. Sun’s reorganization of the Kuomintang upset some older members, and created suspicions among some overseas members about his alliance with the communists, that he had to explain:
“First, their suspicions of Russia were due to their living in imperialist countries, where they were drenched with anti-Russian propaganda … He then explained that the ‘Principle of the People’s Livelihood’ actually encompassed the doctrine of socialism, which in turn encompassed two lesser doctrines, communism and collectivism … There was no great difference between the Kuomintang’s principles and communism. Furthermore, the application of communism did not originate in Russia but in Hun Hsiu-chuan’s Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. Nor did Russia practice pure communism; what it had put into effect really was a policy of the people’s livelihood.” [Sun Yat-sen, by Martin Wilbur, pg. 192]
On January 30th 1924, the last day of the Kuomintang’s First National Congress, Dr. Sun proposed twenty-four persons for the Central Executive Committee – including three communists, and he proposed seventeen reserve members – including seven communists, one of whom was a young 30-year-old, named Mao Tse-tung.
Please note, that Mao was higher up, in the Kuomintang’s leadership structure than lowly Chiang!!!, and it was approved by the party members.
Dr. Sun had seen something in Mao, that he hadn’t seen in Chiang. Chiang was never to be appointed to any political position in the Kuomintang, only to military positions.
During the Congress, Chiang had been appointed as the chairman of the Preparatory Committee of the Military Academy, and he had been also reappointed to the party's Military Council. However, (lowly) Chiang abruptly resigned as chairman of the Preparatory Committee because:
“Chiang and the Soviet advisers differed substantially on important points concerning the curriculum and management of the academy” and Chiang, “indignant at Soviet objections to his plans” and unable to exercise full authority as he would have it, tendered his resignation.” [The Early Chiang Kai-shek, by Pichon Loh, pg. 91]
And he sulked back home to Chekiang, again.
In a letter to Dr. Sun of March 2nd 1924, Chiang stated his reason for his resignation:
“Chiang then brought up the matter that must have been foremost in his mind, namely, the question of ‘new influences’ in the party”. [ibid, pg. 93]
Chiang would write letters to party leaders, that he:
“dismissed the sincerity of the Soviets in cooperating with the Kuomintang” [and] “moreover, he urged faithful party members to disagree with Sun Yat-sen if need be.” [!!!]
“Spiritually and historically speaking, Mr. Sun's task has succeeded; but the effective implementation of this task at the present time is the responsibility of all of us and not that of Mr. Sun alone. We ought not simply to acquiesce and let matters drift, nor should we allow him to insist on his own opinions at the expense of the integrity of his comrades.” [ibid, pg. 95]
So much for Chiang’s professed devotion to Dr. Sun - he was organizing for his replacement already!!! and for the counter-revolution!!!
Meanwhile as Chiang was in Chekiang, the Russian instructors, arms and funds were beginning to arrive, and Liao Chung-kai and a committee of seven began the planning and establishment of the military academy, and the selecting of the staff and examining all of the 3,000 applicants for the first 500 students.
Unfortunately, the first recruiters were jailed or killed by rival militarists, and the recruitment was largely done by Chen Kuo-fu, and so, a large part of the applicants were from the Green Gang!!!
By May, Chiang’s backers had succeeded in having him return, from his three-month staged tantrum, to Guangdong, to meet with Dr. Sun and to be appointed as the commandant of the Whampoa Military Academy, and also as the chief-of-staff to the Kwangtung Amy under the command of Hsu Ch'ung-chih.
Although Chiang was commandant at Whampoa, the cadets were taught by the Russian instructors, and also were taught by Chou En-lai, the director of the Academy’s Political Department.
But now we can begin see the real Chiang, someone who had never done anything in terms of the political campaigns, and had done very little in the military campaigns, as he continued to show his disdain of Dr. Sun’s leadership.
“During the next six months, until Sun's departure for Peking on November 13, Chiang was to disagree with Sun on many issues and even to disobey orders in several instances … Their disagreement over this issue must have been a factor in influencing Chiang's formal though not final resignation as commandant of the Whampoa Academy on September 16.” [ibid, pg. 96-97]
“In another instance, Dr. Sun wrote to Chiang on October 8 castigating him for his failure to apply to Whampoa the Soviet-inspired military organizational system Sun had personally drafted. His disgust with Chiang’s recalcitrance was evident in his statement that the rejection of his plan was a clear indication of the tradition-bound mentality of those ‘Japanese-trained cadets and Paoting officers who know very little and comprehend even less and who are totally ignorant of the general international situation’. Moreover, their disagreement over the Second Northern Expedition which Sun had launched on September 18 ran so deep that Chiang in fact disobeyed Sun's direct orders to evacuate the Whampoa and indeed requested the recall of Whampoa cadets from front line duties.” [ibid, pg. 97-98]
Professor Loh concludes with this dismal prognosis of Chiang’s future, that:
“No suggestion is intended that Chiang would necessarily have been given more important assignments or entrusted with the primary responsibility for nation-building had Sun lived longer to preside over a more careful distribution of power among the leading party personalities.” [ibid, pg. 98-99]
Chiang wasn’t going much farther, unless something drastic happened!