On the Trail of the Treasonous - Chapter 8
Miranda's Plan for Liberation
When Francisco de Miranda had tired of waiting for any help from the British for his fight for independence of the Spanish colonies in southern America, he finally made his way to America. Without his friend Alexander Hamilton, he would nonetheless try to win support from the United States for his plan. Miranda felt that he had an unwritten agreement with Jefferson and Madison, but when his attempt at an insurrection in Spanish America failed - because Aaron Burr and his co-conspirators exposed his plan to the Spanish minister, then the Jefferson administration had to disavow any knowledge or consent with Miranda’s plan. Miranda was forced to return back to London, and so, any further attempts for independence would be run under the control and manipulation of the British Empire’s intelligence services, and directed by their lust for Spanish colonial resources.
William Smith
After realizing that there wouldn’t be any forthcoming support or action by the British government – ‘discontent with the fluctuating policy of the English ministers in regard to the Spanish Indies’, Francisco de Miranda decided that any future hope for his plan to liberate the Spanish colonies, lay with the United States.
Setting sail from Britain on September 7th 1805, he arrived at New York on November 9th, and immediately sought out his acquaintances and collaborators from London – Rufus King, the former American minister to Britain; and William Smith, the former secretary to the American legation in London, who had been appointed Surveyor of Revenue at the port of New York, by his father-in-law, then President John Adams. Smith would introduce Miranda to Captain Lewis, ‘who commanded a vessel in the West India trade’ and to Samuel Ogden, a merchant in New York and the owner of the vessel, who agreed to supply him with arms and provisions.
Miranda would also meet with some of Burr’s confidents – Jonathan Drayton and John Swartwout, who while appearing to wish to help Miranda with his plans, were really only wanting to further their own conspiracy with Burr.
Rufus King suggested that Miranda make certain that his plan was not contrary to the plans of the federal government, and so, Miranda decided to try to meet with President Jefferson and with members of the administration.
Miranda left on November 29th to travel to Washington, stopping on the way at Philadelphia to consult with Dr. Benjamin Rush, another old acquaintance, who provided him with a letter of introduction to Secretary of State Madison, writing that:
“he is still the friend of liberty, and a believer in the practicability of governments that shall have for their objects the happiness of nations, instead of the greatness of individuals. He knows your character, and longs to do homage to your principles.”
While in Philadelphia, ‘at the house of a common friend’ Miranda also met with Burr (who had recently met with President Jefferson, on November 30th). Burr would later say that Miranda was ‘a fool, totally unqualified for such an expedition’, while Miranda would later describe Burr as ‘detestable’ and ‘Mephistophelean’, and as having betrayed his plans to the Spanish minister, Carlos Martinez de Yrujo.
On December 6th (one day after his first meeting with Dayton!) Yrujo wrote to Secretary of State, James Madison, to object to certain passages in Madison’s Message to Congress.
In it, he discussed the failed attempt in 1803 of Americans to penetrate the Spanish territory at Baton Rouge, by the Kemper brothers and ‘other malcontents from the Spanish side with them’ who were later arrested, and that:
“… but if a story of this nature should be certain, I can assure you that the government of the United States shall not fail to receive the appropriate satisfaction from Spain, whose government has too well established its reputation for one to attribute to it knowledge or appropriation of acts as improper in their character as useless in their effects. Incidents of this nature often occur on the borders of all countries and only deserve attention when they receive the sanction of the government of the aggressors, or the satisfaction due in such case is denied.”
Yrujo was so very diplomatically warning Madison if the United States should sanction Miranda’s plans.
That same day, on December 6th, Miranda arrived at Washington City and called on President Jefferson and Madison. After a short visit to the tomb of General Washington, Miranda returned to the capital, where he was invited to meet with Madison on the 11th, and also was invited to dine with the President on the 13th.
In his diary, Miranda wrote that he told Madison that:
“to ensure the success of his plan it would only be necessary for the United States government to ‘wink’ at his activities.”
In another meeting two days later, he noted that:
“Madison said that although his government looked favorably on the project for the emancipation of South America, yet he did not see how it could furnish assistance at that juncture without showing a lack of good faith”,
and that:
“he did not conceive the need of his government either smiling upon the affair or viewing it with anger; for citizens of the United States could do whatever her laws did not absolutely prohibit, especially in an affair which was honorable and useful.”
[from ‘The Life of Miranda’, by William Robertson.]
Yrujo again informed Cevallos, from reports he had received from Dayton, that he had been informed by Dayton (!!!) of Miranda’s meetings in Washington City with Madison, that:
“the Secretary of State, with whom Miranda had two conferences, doubtless suspecting the origin of this mission, had at first treated him with reserve; but at last had opened himself so far as to say that he did not know whether the United States would or would not declare war against Spain, because this step must depend on Congress; that in this uncertainty he could not permit himself to offer Miranda the aid asked; but that if private citizens in the United States chose to advance their funds for the undertaking, as Miranda had suggested, the Government would shut its eyes to their conduct, provided that Miranda took his measures in such a way as not to compromise the Government. At the same time the secretary coincided in Miranda’s idea that in case the United States should determine upon war with Spain, this undertaking would prove to be a diversion favorable to the views of the American government.”
Miranda was back in New York by December 29th, and told Smith that he had the “tacit appropriation and good wishes” of the Government as long as the laws were not “openly violated”, and that the Government would “wink at the things being done by individuals”. After six weeks spent in fitting out ships and raising a company of volunteers, on February 2nd 1806, Miranda, with Captain Lewis and the ship ‘Leander’, sailed from New York.
Before Miranda left, he wrote to Madison to thank him for his attention during his stay in Washington City and to express his hope that the important issues that they had shared (concerning what “passed with the British government”) would remain “the most profound secret until the final result of that delicate affair”. Miranda assured him that he had acted “in everything to the intentions of the U.S. government”, which he hoped to have understood and respected “with exactness and discretion”.
After Miranda had sailed from New York for Jacmel in Haiti, Yrujo received letters from the Spanish consul in New York – with all the details concerning Miranda’s forces and his destination, and Yrujo immediately sent despatches to the Governor of Cuba, the Viceroy of New Spain, and the Captain General of Venezuela, forewarning them of Miranda’s plan.
After spending a month at Jacmel, Miranda and his small force of 200 men finally arrived at Venezuela and attempted to embark at Puerto Cabello during the night of April 27th.
But having been forewarned by Yrujo, the Spanish coast guard vessels were prepared for an attack, and engaged them, forcing Miranda and Lewis in the ‘Leander’ to sail away, while capturing their other two small unarmed schooners with 60 men – after a trial, 10 men were hanged and the rest imprisoned. A reward of 30,000 pesos was offered for Miranda’s capture – dead or alive!
Yrujo had also received new information from Dayton. Dayton said that Madison and Miranda had agreed that the Government should use the pretext of asking Yrujo’s recall in order to refuse to receive communications from him, and thus prevent him from claiming official interference against the ‘Leander’.
On February 4th, Yrujo sent a letter of protest to Madison, that:
“this administration may be pleased to take the most effective measures to counteract, if there is still time, the scandalous violation of the neutrality of the United States by the traitor Miranda, and some American citizens, in the arming, and formation in New York of an expedition against the possessions of the king in this part of the world ... these circumstances are certain, and although it is too late for the government of the United States to stop this voyage, it is not too late for it to adopt the measures which are at its disposal to vindicate such a serious insult, committed with continuing scandal and notoriety before the eyes of the officers and agents of the federal government in said city … the government ought not to be surprised if its citizens involved in this enterprise are treated as pirates, and the responsibility for the results remaining with those who deserve it.”
On February 5th, President Jefferson wrote to Madison that:
“I think the District atty of N.Y. should be immediately instructed to investigate the expedition of the ‘Leander’, & of every person concerned in it; and to learn how it has happened that the officers of the government at that place should have paid no attention & given no information of it while going on. on the report of the Atty to us we may decide what shall be done.”
Yrujo also sent a similar letter to Turreau, the French ambassador, who then arranged a meeting on February 7th with Madison to demand an explanation on the affair. Madison had replied that the President had ordered measures to be taken against the accomplices in the country and against the culprits who should return. Madison had to conciliate Turreau, since his whole policy with securing the Floridas from Spain had relied on the intervention and persuasion in America’s favor by the Government of Napoleon’s France.
Smith was fired from his position as surveyor of the port of New York, and arrest warrants were issued for Smith and Ogden on February 28th. The next day, they were examined by Judge Matthias Talmadge, and they gave their depositions concerning Miranda’s expedition.
On April 7th they were charged with having “with force and arms, set on foot a certain military enterprise, to be carried on from thence against the dominions of some foreign state … with whom the United States were then and there at peace … against the peace of the United States and their dignity.” [i.e. they were charged with violating the 1794 Neutrality Act.]
When Smith’s trial began on July 14th, his defence would be to attempt to prove that at the time the United States was not at peace with Spain, that the enterprise took place with the knowledge and approbation of the President, and also that the President had ordered the prosecution and had restrained the witnesses from attending!
His counsel had tried to call as witnesses Secretary of State Madison, Secretary of War Dearborn, and Secretary of the Navy Robert Smith, but President Jefferson “has specially signified to us that our official duties cannot, consistently therewith, be at this juncture dispensed with.” But it was argued that “as the facts charged in this indictment, if committed at all, were committed at the city of New York, the court could not perceive how the above-named persons, who reside at the city of Washington, and were there during the transaction, could be material witnesses on the trial of the indictment.”
Defence counsel attempted to read messages of the President to Congress – since they were not allowed to disprove “that the United States were at peace with Spain when this expedition was set on foot”, they would then attempt to show “that Spain was not at peace with us”, but it was “decided as not being material to the issue”.
[i.e. the President’s December 3rd (public) Address that “I have therefore, found it necessary, at length, to give orders to our troops on that frontier to be in readiness to protect our citizens, and to repel by arms any similar aggressions in future”, that was printed in the newspapers!!!.]
However, the trial continued until on July 22nd, “the jury retired, and after an absence of two hours, they returned a verdict of Not Guilty”.
On July 26th, the trial of Samuel Ogden proceeded, after which “the jury retired, and, after a short absence, returned a verdict of Not Guilty”.
Note: While Samuel Ogden’s father and three brothers had supported the British King in the War for Independence, Samuel had remained an American patriot and was the owner of the Boonton Iron Works that supplied the Continental Army with axes, kettles, horseshoes, tires, cups, rods and sheet-iron. Colonel Samuel Ogden later became a landowner in upstate New York, along with his brother-in-law Gouverneur Morris and Judge William Cooper, the father of James Fenimore Cooper.
After the failed invasion attempt at Puerto Cabello on April 27th, Miranda’s ship was met by a British sloop of war and escorted to Grenada for supplies, and then sailed to Barbados to meet the British Admiral Cochrane, who promised to assist Miranda with a naval force and to protect him from an attack by the Spanish. In return, Miranda promised commercial privileges to the British in the newly-liberated South American nations. Miranda was also allowed to recruit volunteers at Barbados and also at Trinidad, before leaving with 300 men, and accompanied by 7 British ships for protection.
Although Miranda requested more substantial aid from the British Governors, no more assistance could be sent without a direct order from the British government in London. A request for 5,000 men for a South American Expedition was denied by the British ministry on July 15th.
With no help from the British navy, Miranda led his small forces in another attempt at Veneuela. On August 3rd, a landing was made, driving the Spanish forces out of the fort and town of Vela de Coro. As the Spanish Captain General was marching with a force of 4,000 from the capital city, to aid the 1,500 men being assembled from the local province, Miranda called a council of war. Due to their small force, and with no men or supplies coming from the British government, and the lack of assistance from the local natives (anyone who did not take up arms against the invaders were to be considered as traitors) it was decided that they must evacuate Vela de Coro.
By October, the ships had eventually returned to Grenada and the force was disbanded.
[next week - chapter 9 - Jefferson’s Winds of Change]
For those who may wish to support my continuing work on ‘The Unveiling of Canadian History’, you may purchase my books, that are available as PDFs and Paperback (on Amazon) at the Canadian Patriot Review :
Volume 1 – The Approaching Conflict, 1753 – 1774.
Volume 2 – Forlorn Hope – Quebec and Nova Scotia, and the War for Independence, 1775 – 1785.
Volume 3 – The Storming of Hell – the War for the Territory Northwest of the Ohio, 1786 – 1796.
And hopefully,
Volume 4 – Ireland, Haiti, and Louisiana – the Idea of a Continental Republic, 1797 – 1804,
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Volume 5 – On the Trail of the Treasonous, 1804 - 1814.