To Shining Sea - Chapter 9
Hamilton Becomes Second-in-Command of the Army, October 19th 1798
The Unveiling of Canadian History, Volume 4.
To Shining Sea – Ireland, Haiti, and Louisiana, and the Idea of a Continental Republic, 1797 – 1804.
On November 7th 1805, Lewis and Clark, and the Corps of Discovery Expedition, would reach the Pacific Ocean – thus asserting the reason for ‘the very name given to those fighters for independence: the Continental army’.
Part 1 – The Irish Frontier
Chapter 9 - Hamilton Becomes Second-in-Command of the Army, October 19th 1798
Many Americans assumed that former President and former General, George Washington would be asked to lead such an army, but the way in which he was asked, began to show the growing uneasiness over President Adams’s leadership. And also began to show President Adams’s jealous dislike of Hamilton.
Secretary of War James McHenry
The act (of May 28th 1798) that authorized President Adams to raise a provisional army, was only to be in the event of a declaration of war against the United States, or of an actual invasion or of imminent danger of an invasion, in which case the president could call into service a number of troops (not exceeding 10,000) to be enlisted for a term not exceeding three years. But, if neither of these events happened, the provisional army would never be raised, and would exist only on paper. However, the act did provide that whenever the President deemed it expedient, he was empowered to appoint a commander of the army, an inspector general, and two major-generals.
Already, on May 19th, Alexander Hamilton had written to General Washington (to learn his thinking if asked to become the commander of the army) that:
“you ought also to be aware, my dear Sir, that in the event of an open rupture with France, the public voice will again call you to command the armies of your Country; and though all who are attached to you will from attachment, as well as public considerations, deplore an occasion which should once more tear you from that repose to which you have so good a right – yet it is the opinion of all those with whom I converse that you will be compelled to make the sacrifice.”
General Washington replied (on May 27th) that:
“if a crisis should arrive when a sense of duty, or a call from my country, should become so imperious as to leave me no choice, I should prepare for the relinquishment, and go with as much reluctance from my present peaceful abode, as I should do to the tombs of my ancestors.”
He then inquired of Hamilton’s thinking if he was asked to serve, that:
“it may well be supposed too, that I should like, previously, to know who would be my coadjutors, and whether you would be disposed to take an active part, if arms are to be resorted to.”
Hamilton answered him on June 2nd that:
“if I am invited to a station in which the service I may render may be proportioned to the sacrifice I am to make – I shall be willing to go into the army. If you command, the place in which I should hope to be most useful is that of Inspector General with a command in the line. This I would accept.”
On June 22nd, President Adams wrote to General Washington that:
“in forming an army, whenever I must come to that extremity, I am at an immense loss whether to call out the old Generals or to appoint a young set … I must tax you, sometimes for advice. We must have your name, if you, in any case permit us to use it. There will be more efficacy in it, than in many an army.”
On July 2nd, before General Washington replied to this letter, President Adams wrote to the Senate that:
“I nominate George Washington of Mount Vernon to be Lieutenant General and Commander in Chief of all the armies raised or to be raised in the United States.”
Washington would learn of his appointment – when reading a newspaper!!!
Note: In a letter to Knox (August 9th) General Washington related that ‘the first knowledge I had of my own appointment – nay, the first intimation that such a measure was in contemplation, was contained in a news-paper, as a complete act of the President & Senate – accompanied with a few lines from the Secretary of War of equal date (4th of July) informing me that he should be the bearer of my commission, and the President’s instructions to make some, but does not say what, arrangements.’
On July 4th, General Washington replied to President Adam’s letter of June 22nd, that:
“in case of actual invasion by a formidable force, I certainly should not intrench myself under the cover of age & retirement, if my services should be required by my country, to assist in repelling it.”
On July 7th, President Adams would finally write to General Washington informing him of his appointment. The letter would be delivered personally by James McHenry, Secretary of War, who met with General Washington on July 11th. McHenry also delivered a confidential letter to General Washington from Hamilton.
On July 8th, Hamilton wrote to General Washington that:
“I was much surprised on my arrival here to discover that your nomination had been without any previous consultation of you … I use the liberty which my attachment to you and to the public authorizes, to offer my opinion that you should not decline the appointment. It is evident that the public satisfaction at it is lively and universal. It is not to be doubted that the circumstance will give an additional spring to the public mind – will tend much to unite and will facilitate the measures which the conjuncture requires – on the other hand, your declining would certainly produce the opposite effects, would throw a great damp upon the ardor of the country, inspiring the idea that the crisis was not really serious or alarming ...
The President has no relative ideas & his prepossessions on military subjects in reference to such a point are of the wrong sort. If you accept it will be conceived that the arrangement is yours & you will be responsible for it in reputation. This & the influence of a right arrangement upon future success seem to require that you should in one mode or another see efficaciously that the arrangement is such as you would approve.”
On July 13th, General Washington wrote to President Adams that:
“satisfied therefore, that you have sincerely wished and endeavored to avert war, and exhausted to the last drop, the cup of reconciliation, we can with pure hearts appeal to Heaven for the justice of our cause, and may confidently trust the final result to that kind Providence who has heretofore, and so often, signally favored the people of these United States.
Thinking in this manner, and feeling how incumbent it is upon every person, of every description, to contribute at all times to his country’s welfare, and especially in a moment like the present, when every thing we hold dear & sacred is so seriously threatened, I have finally determined to accept the commission of Commander in Chief of the Armies of the United States, with the reserve only, that I shall not be called into the field until the army is in a situation to require my presence, or it becomes indispensable by the urgency of circumstances.”
On July 14th, General Washington replied to Hamilton that:
“I have consented to embark once more on a boundless field of responsibility & trouble, with two reservations – first, that the principal officers in the line, and of the staff, shall be such as I can place confidence in; and, that I shall not be called into the field until the army is in a situation to require my presence, or it becomes indispensable by the urgency of circumstances …
By the pending bill, if it passes to a law, two Major Generals, and an Inspector Genl. with the Rank of Major General and three Brigadiers are to be appointed. Presuming on its passing, I have given the following as my sentiments respecting the characters fit, & proper to be employed; in which the Secretary concurs.
Major Generals: Alexr. Hamilton, Inspector; Chas. C. Pinckney; Henry Knox – or if either of the last mentioned refuses, Henry Lee.”
On July 16th, Washington wrote to Knox informing him of his appointment as Commander-in-chief, and:
“that I have placed you among those characters on whom I wish to lean, for support. But my dear Sir … I must add, that causes – which would exceed the limits of an ordinary letter to explain, are in the way of such an arrangement as might render your situation perfectly agreeable; but I fondly hope that, the difficulty will not be insurmountable, in your decision ... I would fain hope, as we are forming an army anew, which army, if needful at all, is to fight for every thing that ought to be dear and sacred to freemen, that former rank will be forgot; and among the fit & chosen characters, the only contention will be, who shall be foremost in zeal, at this crisis, to serve his country.”
On July 16th an act was passed to augment the army of the United States – to augment the existing 4 (‘old’) regiments in the United States army with the addition of 12 new regiments and 6 new troops of light dragoons.
On July 17th, President Adams sent to the Senate the letter he had just received from General Washington, who wrote that:
“I must not conceal from you my earnest wish that the choice had fallen upon a man less inclined in years, and better qualified to encounter the usual vicissitudes of war … and the determination I had consoled myself with, of closing the remnant of my days in my present peaceful abode … It was not possible for me to remain ignorant of, or indifferent to, recent transactions … and feeling how incumbent it is upon every person, of every description, to contribute at all times to his country’s welfare, and especially in a moment like the present, when every thing we hold dear and sacred is so seriously threatened, I have finally determined to accept the commission.”
However, without any discussion with General Washington over the delicate issue of rank for the Major Generals, President Adams sent to the Senate, on July 18th, his nomination of Alexander Hamilton of New York to be Inspector General of the Army with the rank of Major General, and additionally of Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, Henry Knox of Massachusetts as Major-Generals; and of Henry Lee of Virginia and Edward Hand of Pennsylvania to be Major Generals of the Provisional Army. It was approved by the Senate the next day.
On July 25th, McHenry wrote to Hamilton and to Knox (Pinckney had not yet returned from his mission to France) informing them of their appointments, but that they hadn’t yet been called into service or given a command.
On that same day, July 25th, now that Congress was adjourned for the summer, and also to escape a yellow fever epidemic, President Adams and his wife left Philadelphia to return home to Quincy, Massachusetts.
On July 28th, Hamilton replied to McHenry, accepting his appointment as Inspector General.
But, however, on August 5th Knox wrote to McHenry that he would not yet accept the appointment due to his demand that he be placed higher in rank than Hamilton or Pinckney, due to his superior rank in the Continental Army, and that:
“it is therefore important, previously to my answering affirmatively or negatively, as to an acceptance, that you inform me on these points. Whether the order of names, as specified in the list, is intended to establish, the priority of rank? Or whether the former relative rank is intended to govern, according to the heretofore established principles, and invariable practice? Those principles determine explicitly that all appointments, made in the same grade and on the same day, are to be governed by the former relative rank.”
Earlier, on July 29th Knox had also written to General Washington, concerning his view of rank, that:
“at present I do not perceive how it can possibly be to any other purport, than in the negative, unless the relative rank of the late War, should govern according to the established and invariable usage of the former war.”
On August 9th, General Washington replied to Knox, writing of the uncomfortable position he had been placed in, and of his efforts to try to settle the matter, that:
“My earnest desire, often repeated, was, that Congress could be prevailed on, circumstanced as things were, to vest a power in the president to make appointments in the recess of the Senate, rather than precipitate the organization of the army, that time might be allowed for a deliberate & harmonious consultation in the arrangement, (of the General Officers at least); and I offered to attend in Philadelphia myself, & send for Colo. Hamilton and you to meet me there, for this very desirable purpose: I even hastened – precipitately – Mr. McHenry’s return, in hopes he might be back in time to accomplish this object: guarding however against the failure.
Under this statement which you will find correct, how was it possible for me, who had never in the remotest degree, directly nor indirectly, interfered in any matter of government since I left the chair of it, to have consulted you, previously to the nomination of the General Officers? and if giving in your name without, in the manner it was handed to the President (which seemed to be the result of necessity, proceeding from causes which have been communicated) is considered as a wound to your feelings, might I not complain upon ground equally strong & hurtful to mine? brought as I was, without the least intimation, before the public, after it had been officially announced to the world, and I hope, believed, that my soul panted for rest; and that the first wish of my heart was to spend the remnant of a life worn down with cares; in ease & contemplation? But left as I was by this act without an alternative, or a very disagreeable one, I passed it over in silence, from a conviction that if affairs are in the alarming state they are represented to be, that it was not a time to complain, or stand upon punctilios.”
On August 4th, McHenry had written to President Adams that due to the enormous amount of work that he had in preparing for the enlisting, the planning and the logistics in the augmentation to the army, that:
“you will give me leave to call effectually to my aid, the Inspector General, and likewise General Knox; and to charge them with the management of particular branches of the service.”
On August 14th, President Adams replied to McHenry’s request that:
“I desire that you would inform General Washington, that I consider him in the public service from the date of his appointment and intitled to all the emoluments of it … Calling any other General Officers into service at present will be attended with difficulty, unless the rank were settled. In my opinion, as the matter now stands, General Knox is legally intitled to rank next to General Washington, and no other arrangement will give satisfaction. If General Washington is of this opinion and will consent to it, you may call him into actual service as soon as you please. The consequence of this will be that Pinckney must rank before Hamilton. If it shall be consented that the rank shall be Knox, Pinckney and Hamilton, you may call the latter too into immediate service, when you please. Any other plan will occasion long delay and much confusion. You may depend upon it the five New England states will not patiently submit to the humiliation that has been meditated for them.”
President Adams was now siding with Knox and risking a conflict with General Washington.
Note: Knox’s claim was based upon rules adopted by the Continental Army, not the Continental Congress, and before the establishment of the federal government under to the Constitution.
McHenry, being now placed in the awkward position as middle-man to explain President Adams’s plan, would write to General Washington that:
“something or other … had caused a very great change in his (the President’s) mind”, and that:
“it may be that the President has conceived certain prejudices unfavorable to General Hamilton that has influenced him in the present case.”
On August 11th, McHenry had written to Hamilton, sending him a copy of Knox’s August 5th letter, and asking ‘what is to be said to General Knox?’
Hamilton replied, on August 19th, sending both an official reply that:
“the intention as to the relative grades of the officers appointed is presumed to be unequivocal. It is believed that the rule to which General Knox refers can have no application to the case of the formation of a new army, at a new epoch – embracing officers not previously in actual service. It was not a permanent provision of law, but a regulation adapted to the peculiar circumstances of the late army and, governing as far as I recollect, only in the cases of promotions from lower subsisting grades to higher ones”;
and a private reply, with a draft of a reply to Knox that:
“to advise him to accept, with a reservation of his claim ad referendum upon the ground of the rule he quotes, and with the understanding that it will not be understood to engage him to continue if the matter be not finally settled according to his claim.”
On August 20th, McHenry sent to President Adams the drafts for two letters to Knox – one private and the other official.
President Adams replied to McHenry, on August 29th, that:
“I could not send him [i.e. Knox] either your official or private letter, as neither contains sentiments that I can approve. My opinion is and has always been clear, that as the law now stands, the order of nomination or of recording has no weight or effect, but that officers appointed on the same day, in whatever order, had a right to rank according to antecedent services. I made the nomination according to the list presented to me, by you, from General Washington, in hopes that rank might be settled among them by agreement or acquiescence, believing at the same time, and expressing to you that belief, that the nomination and appointment would give Hamilton no command at all, nor any rank before any Major-General. This is my opinion still. I am willing to settle all decisively at present (and have no fear of the consequences) by dating the commissions Knox, on the first day, Pinckney on the 2nd. Hamilton on the third.”
McHenry would send a copy of this letter to General Washington.
Secretary of War McHenry then discussed this situation together with Secretary of the Treasury Wolcott, Secretary of State Pickering, and Secretary of the Navy Stoddert and
“it was proposed, that they should join in a respectful representation to the President. After however a good deal of deliberation the idea of a joint address was relinquished for a representation from Mr. Wolcott alone, who did not appear to be implicated in his suspicions of intrigue.”
On September 17th, Wolcott wrote to President Adams that:
“General Washington has never disclosed a wish to interfere with any of the powers constitutionally vested in the President. Nevertheless I presume it to have been the intention of the President and the expectation of General Washington, that the principal arrangements should be made in concert … that without such concert everything must go wrong …
the circumstances of the case in respect to General Washington appear therefore to be, first, that he was nominated to command the armies without any previous consultation or notice; second, that his ‘advice in the formation of a list of officers’ was requested, accompanied with an intimation that ‘his opinion on all subjects would have great weight’; third, that General Washington formed a list of officers, and after mature deliberation settled the rank, which in his judgement, the officers in question ought to enjoy in the proposed army; fourth, that in the nominations exhibited by the President to the Senate, the order proposed by General Washington respecting those Gentlemen was preserved …
contrary to expectation, General Knox claims the first rank, and in support of his pretensions refers to a rule adopted in the Revolutionary War, by which according to his statement, among officers appointed to the same grade, on the same day, their relative rank in the new grade, was to be determined by their respective ranks, prior to such new appointments …
No general and unqualified rule of the kind alluded to by General Knox, is to be found by me in the resolutions of Congress: it is however presumed that the regulations prescribed on the 24th of November 1778, are those to which he refers – A due attention to these regulations will evince, that they are wholly inapplicable to the present state of things …
besides, the President’s acts must be founded on and be consistent with some principle – And if one officer is allowed to claim rank with reference to services in the late war, all will expect the same privilege – If the principle is allowed in some instances and not allowed in others, the conduct of the President will be considered as arbitrary and directed by personal favor.”
On September 20th, McHenry received a letter from General Washington (in reply to sending him President Adams’s letter of August 29th) with his threat to resign, that:
“I can perceive pretty clearly however, that the matter is, or very soon will be brought, to the alternative of submitting to the President’s forgetfulness of what I considered a compact or condition of acceptance of the appointment with which he was pleased to honor me, or, to return him my commission.”
On September 21st, McHenry immediately wrote to General Washington to inform him of the history of the whole affair and of Wolcott’s current effort to correct the situation.
On September 25th, General Washington then wrote to President Adams that:
“this opportunity (i.e. to have been asked ‘on what terms I would have consented to the nomination’ previous to being appointed) was not afforded before I was brought to public view. To declare them afterwards, was all I could do … They were, that the General Officers, and General Staff of the Army should not be appointed without my concurrence. I extended my stipulations no farther … in the arrangement made by me, with the Secretary of War, the three Major Generals stood – Hamilton, Pinckney, Knox. and in this order I expected their commissions would have been dated. This, I conceive, must have been the understanding of the Senate. And certainly was the expectation of all those with whom I have conversed. But you have been pleased to order the last to be first, and the first to be last …
We are now, near the end of September, and not a man recruited, nor a Battalion Officer appointed, that has come to my knowledge. The consequence is, that the spirit and enthusiasm which prevailed a month or two ago, and would have produced the best men in a short time, is evaporating fast, and a month or two hence, may induce but few, and those perhaps of the worst sort, to enlist. Instead therefore of having the augmented force in a state of preparation, and under a course of discipline, it is now to be raised; and possibly may not be in existence when the enemy is in the field: we shall then have to meet veteran troops, inured to conquest, with militia, or raw recruits; the consequence of which is not difficult to conceive, or to foretell …
I hope with respect … to be informed whether your determination to reverse the order of the three Major Generals is final.”
On September 30th, President Adams simply wrote to McHenry, without any explanations of his intentions, that:
“inclosed are the commissions for the three generals signed and all dated on the same day.”
On October 9th, President Adams replied to General Washington that:
“I received, yesterday, the letter you did the honor to write to me on the 25th of September. You request to be informed, whether my determination to preserve the order of the three Major Generals is final …
I some time ago signed the three commissions and dated them on the same day, in hopes similar to yours that an amicable adjustment or acquiescence might take place among the gentlemen themselves. But, if these hopes should be disappointed, and controversies should arise, they will of course be submitted to you as Commander in Chief, and if after all any one should be so obstinate as to appeal to me from the judgment of the Commander in Chief, I was determined to confirm that judgment.
Because, whatever construction may be put upon the resolutions of the ancient Congress which have been applied to this case, and whether they are at all applicable to it or not, there is no doubt to be made that by the present Constitution of the United States, the President has authority to determine the rank of officers.”
After receiving President Adams’s instructions on September 30th, McHenry was still not sure what to do, and on October 12th, sent all the relevant documents to the other cabinet members – enquiring as to their opinions. The next day, Pickering, Wolcott and Stoddert replied to McHenry that:
“the only inference we can draw from the facts … is, that the President consents to the arrangement of rank as proposed by General Washington and pursued in the order of nomination and appointment by the President and Senate”, and that:
“the Secretary of War ought to transmit the commissions and inform the Generals that in his opinion the rank is definitively settled according to the original arrangement.”
On October 19th, Hamilton accepted his commission. On October 23rd, Knox declined his appointment – ‘no officer can consent to his own degradation by serving in an inferior station’; and on October 31st, Pinckney accepted his commission, having arrived back in the United States from France.
[next week - chapter 10 - The Kentucky Resolutions, November 16th 1798]
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