The Unveiling of Canadian History, Volume 4.
To Shining Sea – Ireland, Haiti, and Louisiana, and the Idea of a Continental Republic, 1797 – 1804.
On November 7th 1805, Lewis and Clark, and the Corps of Discovery Expedition, would reach the Pacific Ocean – thus asserting the reason for ‘the very name given to those fighters for independence: the Continental army’.
Part 1 – The Irish Frontier
Chapter 8 - The American Response to the Despatches
Congress was not swayed by the lies of Talleyrand, and passed laws for preparing their national defenses.
John Marshall
On April 23rd 1798 - four days after the publication of the first five despatches from the American commissioners to France, an address to Congress was sent from the townships of Windsor and Montgomery, and the towns of Princeton and Kingston, New Jersey:
“expressing their unshaken and entire confidence in the wisdom and integrity of the Executive of the United States, and pledging their lives and fortunes, and sacred honor, in support of the Constitution, and such measures of defence as the government may find expedient to adapt, in this critical and threatening aspect of public affairs.”
Over the next weeks, similar addresses, memorials and resolutions came pouring in, from Philadelphia, PA; Georgetown, MD; Newark NJ; Trenton, NJ; New York, NY; Baltimore, MD; Harford city, MD; New Brunswick, NJ; Elkton, MD; Salem, MA; Bucks county, PA; Fairfax county, VA; Portsmouth, NH; Gloucester, MA; Upper Marlboro, MD; Upper Freehold, NJ; Dover, NH; Gloucester county, NJ; Newbern, NC; Elizabeth, NJ; Charleston, SC; Liberty, MD; Lynn, MA; Kent and Queen Ann’s counties, MD; Frederick and Somerset counties, MD; Vergennes, VT; Schenectady, NY; Montgomery and Washington counties, MD; and Georgetown, SC!!!
Congress now passed, and President Adams signed into law, for America’s protection:
‘an act to provide an additional armament for the further protection of the trade of the United States’ (April 27th);
‘an act to establish an Executive department, to be denominated the Department of the Navy’ (April 30th);
‘an act supplementary to the act for the further defense of the ports and harbors of the United States’ (May 3rd); and,
‘an act … to cause to be purchased, or built, a number of small vessels to be equipped as gallies’ (May 4th).
On May 4th, President Adams now sent to Congress the 6th despatch, dated February 7th, from America’s three envoys to France. This despatch contained their letter to Talleyrand, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, that:
“the ministers plenipotentiary and envoys extraordinary from the United States of America to the French Republic, have been hitherto restrained, by the expectation of entering on the objects of their mission in the forms usual among nations, from addressing to the Executive Directory, through you, those explanations and reclamations with which they are charged by the government they represent.”
This long and detailed letter set out to explain the American ‘system of neutrality’ and the United States’ relations and treaties with both France and Great Britain, and the reasons for seeking to end the punitive trade decrees of the French government against the United States.
Congress then passed, and President Adams signed into law, for the defense of the United States:
‘an act authorizing the President of the United States to raise a provisional army’ (May 28th); and,
‘an act more effectually to protect the commerce and coasts of the United States’ (May 28th).
Then, on June 5th, President Adams sent to Congress the 7th despatch, dated March 9th, from the three envoys extraordinary in France. The despatch reported on the envoys’ two meetings with Talleyrand, on March 2nd and 6th.
At the first meeting, Pinckney started by saying that:
“we have received many propositions through Mr. Y to which we had found it impracticable to accede; and that we had now waited on him for the purpose of inquiring whether other means might not be devised which would effect so desirable an object … to remove the subsisting difference between the two republics.”
Talleyrand replied that:
“[this] would require some proof, on the part of the United States, of a friendly disposition, previous to a treaty with us … we ought to search for and propose some means which might furnish this proof; that if we were disposed to furnish it there could be no difficulty in finding it; and he alluded very intelligibly to a loan.”
Gerry answered that:
“it would involve us in a war with Great Britain” and, it would be “a breach of their neutrality.”
At the second meeting, Talleyrand began by stating that:
“[he had] observed that we had some claims on the French government for property taken from American citizens. Some of those claims were probably just. He asked, if they were acknowledged by France, whether we could not give credit as for the payment; say for two years. We answered that we could. He then insisted that it was precisely the same thing; that by such an act we should consent to leave in the hands of France funds to which our citizens were entitled, and which might be used in the prosecution of the war.”
Gerry replied that:
“if the United States make such a loan, it would give too much reason to suppose that their government had consented, in a collusive manner, to the capture of the vessels of their citizens and had thus been furnishing France with supplies to carry on the war …
that a treaty on liberal principles … would be infinitely more advantageous to France than the trifling advantages she would drive from a loan …”
“As we were taking our leave of Mr. Talleyrand, we told him that two of us would return immediately, to receive the instructions of out government, if that would be agreeable to the Directory; if it was not, we would wait some time, in the expectation of receiving instructions.”
Congress again responded, and President Adams signed into law:
‘an act to suspend the commercial intercourse between the United States and France’ (June 13th).
On June 18th, President Adams sent to Congress, the 8th despatch, dated April 3rd, from the envoys in France, that contained a letter from Talleyrand, ‘purporting to be an answer to our memorial of January 17th’; and a letter that was the envoys’ response to Talleyrand.
Talleyrand had answered that:
“the commissioners and envoys extraordinary, reversing the known order of facts, have aimed to pass over, as it were in silence, the just motives of complaint of the French government, and to disguise the true cause of the misunderstanding which is prolonged between the two republics! So that it would appear, from that exposition, as partial as unfaithful, that the French republic has no real grievance to substantiate, no legitimate reparation to demand, whilst the United States should alone have a right to complain – should alone be entitled to claim satisfaction.”
Talleyrand argued that the United States was responsible for the conflict, for not granting any means of reparations for French claims. He continued that:
“an incontestable truth … is, that the priority of grievances and complaints belonged to the French republic … that all the grievances which the commissioners and envoys extraordinary exhibit … are a necessary consequence of the measures which the prior conduct of the United States had justified on the part of the French republic, and which its treaties with the said United States authorized in certain cases.”
Talleyrand further found fault with the United States, that:
“it was thought proper to send to the French republic persons whose opinions and connexions are too well known to hope from them dispositions sincerely conciliatory.”
He also found fault with Jay’s treaty that:
“in this treaty, every thing having been calculated to turn the neutrality of the United States to the disadvantage of the French Republic; and to the advantage of England”
and that:
“[the French republic] was perfectly free, in order to avoid the inconveniences of the treaty of London, to avail itself of the preservative means which the law of nature, the laws of nations, and prior treaties, furnished it”
and further, that:
“the newspapers, known to be under the indirect control of the cabinet, have since the treaty redoubled the invectives and calumnies against the republic and against her principles, her magistrates, and her envoys.”
The three envoys again replied, in a long, detailed account, to ‘detect the sophisms and erroneous statements of the minister’, that:
“a complete review of the conduct of their government, accompanied with a candid and thorough investigation of the real principles on which that conduct was founded, by removing prejudices, might restore sentiments which the United States has ever sought, and still seek to preserve.”
On June 19th Marshall would arrive at Philadelphia from France, and would meet with President Adams, informing him that he had received his passport and had left Paris on April 12th; that Pinckney had received his passport but had remained in southern France due to the ill health of his daughter; and that Gerry had not received his passport and had remained in Paris.
On June 21st, President Adams informed Congress of the arrival of Marshall, and sent to Congress a letter from Gerry – ‘the only one of the three who has not received his conge’, dated April 16th; a letter from Talleyrand to Gerry, dated April 3rd, and Gerry’s reply, dated April 4th.
Adams wrote that:
“I presume that, before this time, he has received fresh instructions (a copy of which accompanies this message) to consent to no loans; and therefore the negotiation may be considered at an end. I will never send another minister to France without assurances that he will be received, respected, and honored, as the representative of a great, free, powerful, and independent nation.”
First, in his letter to President Adams, Gerry wrote that:
“indeed I expected my passport with my colleagues; but I am informed the Directory will not consent to my leaving France; and to bring on an immediate rupture, by adopting this measure, contrary to their wishes, would be in my mind unwarrantable. The object of M. Talleyrand, you will perceive, was to resume our reciprocal communications, and again to discuss the subject of a loan. I thought it best in my answer not merely to object to this, but to every measure that could have a tendency to draw me into a negotiation. I accepted of this mission, my dear sir, to support your administration, and have brought myself into a predicament (I allude to my painful residence here as a political cipher), which you must assist me to extricate myself from, by appointing others to supply the places of myself and colleagues, if further progress in this business should be found practicable.”
Second, in his letter of April 3rd, Talleyrand wrote that:
“I suppose, sir, that Messrs. Pinckney and Marshall have thought it useful and proper, in consequence of the intimations given in the end of my note … and the obstacle which their known opinions have interposed to the desired reconciliation, to quit the territory of the republic”, and he then invited Gerry “to resume our reciprocal communication upon the interests of the French republic and the United States of America.”
Third, in his reply on April 4th, Gerry answered that:
“whilst my colleagues and myself, to whom the government of the United States have intrusted the affairs of the embassy, had a joint agency therein, I have carefully imparted to them all the propositions which you have requested, and the relative conferences and to yourself our decisions thereon … But as, by the tenor of your letter, it is now expected that they will quit the territory of the French republic, it will be impossible for me to be the medium of, or to take, any measures which will be painful to my colleagues, or not to afford them all the assistance in my power …
You have proposed … to resume our reciprocal communications upon the interests of the French republic and of the United States … To resume this subject will be unavailing, because the measure, for the reasons which I then urged, is utterly impracticable. I can only then confer informally and unaccredited on any subject respecting our mission, and communicate to the government of the United States the result of such conferences being in my individual capacity unauthorized to give them an official stamp.”
Before Congress ended this session, they passed and President Adams signed into law, new measures:
‘an act authorizing the defense of the merchant vessels of the United States against French depredations’ (June 25th);
‘an act concerning aliens’ (June 25th);
‘an act respecting alien enemies’ (July 6th);
‘an act to declare the treaties heretofore concluded with France no longer obligatory on the United States’ (July 7th);
‘an act for establishing and organizing a marine corps’ (July 11th);
‘an act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States’ (July 14th); and,
‘an act to augment the army of the United States’ (July 16th).
All of these despatches and letters show the honest and unimpeachable attempts of the American envoys to deal with the ‘sophisms and erroneous statements’ of Talleyrand.
[next week - chapter 9 - Hamilton Becomes Second-in-Command of the Army, October 19th 1798]
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For those who may wish to support my continuing work on ‘The Unveiling of Canadian History’, you may purchase my books, that are available as PDFs and Paperback (on Amazon) at the Canadian Patriot Review :
Volume 1 – The Approaching Conflict, 1753 – 1774.
Volume 2 – Forlorn Hope – Quebec and Nova Scotia, and the War for Independence, 1775 – 1785.
And hopefully,
Volume 3 – The Storming of Hell – the War for the Territory Northwest of Ohio, 1786 – 1796, and
Volume 4 – Ireland, Haiti, and Louisiana – the Idea of a Continental Republic, 1797 – 1804,
may also appear in print, in the near future, while I continue to work on :
Volume 5 – On the Trail of the Treasonous, 1804 - 1814.