To Shining Sea - Chapter 6
The Despatches of the American Commissioners arrive in Philadelphia, March 4th 1798
The Unveiling of Canadian History, Volume 4.
To Shining Sea – Ireland, Haiti, and Louisiana, and the Idea of a Continental Republic, 1797 – 1804.
On November 7th 1805, Lewis and Clark, and the Corps of Discovery Expedition, would reach the Pacific Ocean – thus asserting the reason for ‘the very name given to those fighters for independence: the Continental army’.
Part 1 – The Irish Frontier
Chapter 6 - The Despatches of the American Commissioners arrive in Philadelphia, March 4th 1798
The coming rupture in the state of affairs between the United States and France started with the threats and attempted blackmail by the Talleyrand gang, for money and a loan from the Americans - a loan that would have ended America’s neutrality!
General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney
In despatches written from Paris to Pickering, the Secretary of State, the first on October 22nd 1797, and the second on November 8th, the three American commissioners would inform the American government of their attempts to carry out their mission.
These despatches would later be transmitted by President Adams to Congress, ‘omitting only some names’, designated by the letters W. X. Y. Z., ‘and a few expressions, descriptive of the persons’. The commissioners had written that ‘the nature of the above communication will evince the necessity of secrecy; and we have promised Messrs. X and Y that their names shall, in no event, be made public’.
On October 8th, the commissioners met with the new French foreign minister, Talleyrand, who told them that:
“the Directory had required him to make a report relative to the situation of the United States with regard to France, which he was then about, and which would be finished in a few days, when he would let us know what steps were to follow.”
Now, as foreign minister, he wrote in his report to the Directory, ‘Memoir on relations between France and the United States from 1792 – 1797’, that France had no reason to conclude the negotiations quickly, advocating a slow pace to the negotiations – he would use the French objections to President Adams’s speech as a delaying tactic. He explained that he thought Adams was more conciliatory than Washington; that Adams’s slight majority would deter him from adopting a strongly anti-France policy; that Adams was not a tool of the ‘British’ party; that the United States would not go to war; that even if the United States declared war, the public would not support it; and that France should not declare war, because this would harm the French West India colonies and drive the United States into the British orbit.
Note: In a June 7th report to the French foreign minister from France’s charge d’affaires in Philadelphia, Letombe wrote of a meeting he had with Vice President Jefferson, who told him that America was penetrated with gratitude to France and would never forget that it owes its liberation to France; that the new president was another matter; that Adams was vain, irritable, stubborn, endowed with excessive self-love, and still suffering pique at the preference accorded Franklin over him at Paris; but that his term of office was only four years and he did not have popular support; that he only became president by three votes, and that the system of the United States will change along with him.
When President Adams would learn that in private correspondence, Jefferson had accused him of willfully endangering the peace, he would describe Jefferson as ‘eaten to a honeycomb with ambition, yet weak, confused, uninformed, and ignorant’.
The despatches would describe the events:
‘In the morning of October 18th, Mr. W, of the House of ____, called on General Pinckney, and informed him that a Mr. X, who was in Paris, and whom the General had seen, was a gentleman of considerable credit and reputation, and that we might place great reliance on him.’
Later that evening, Mr. X called on Pinckney and informed him:
‘that he was charged with a business in which he was a novice; that he had been acquainted with M. Talleyrand, and that he was sure he had a great regard for America and its citizens; and was very desirous that a reconciliation should be brought about with France; that, to effectuate that end, he was ready, if it was thought proper, to suggest a plan, confidentially, that M. Talleyrand expected would answer the purpose’.
Mr. X said:
‘the Directory … were exceedingly irritated at some passages of the President’s speech, and desired that they should be softened; and that this step would be necessary previous to our reception. That, besides this, a sum of money was required for the pocket of the Directory and minister, and which would be at the disposal of M. Talleyrand; and that a loan would also be insisted on. Mr. X said if we acceded to these measures, M. Talleyrand had no doubt that all our differences with France might be accommodated’.
Pinckney requested that he should make his propositions to all three commissioners and that:
‘for fear of mistake or apprehension, that he should be requested to reduce the heads into writing’.
Mr. X said that:
‘his communication was not immediately with M. Talleyrand, but through another gentleman in whom M. Talleyrand had great confidence. This proved afterwards to be Mr. Y.’
On the 19th the commissioners met with Mr. X, who left them with a first set of propositions that:
‘it is desired that in the official communications there should be given a softening turn to a part of the President’s speech to Congress, which has caused much irritation … The French government desires, besides, to obtain a loan from the United States ... the sum which would be considered as proper, according to diplomatic usage, was about twelve hundred thousand livres’.
On the 20th the commissioners met again with Mr. X and Mr. Y, the confidential friend of Talleyrand, who he said:
‘was willing to aid us in the present negotiation by his good offices with the Directory, who were, he said, extremely irritated against the Government of the United States, on account of some parts of the President’s speech, and who had neither acknowledged nor received us, and consequently have not authorized M. Talleyrand to have any communication with us.’
Mr. Y gave them:
‘a French translation of the President’s speech, the parts of which, objected to by the Directory, were marked … Then he made a second set of propositions.’
First:
‘there is demanded a formal disavowal in writing, declaring that the speech of the citizen president, Barras, did not contain any thing offensive to the Government of the United States, nor any thing which deserved the epithets contained in the whole paragraph’;
Secondly:
‘reparation is demanded for the article by which it shall be declared, that the decree of the Directory there mentioned, did not contain any thing contrary to the treaty of 1778, and had none of those fatal consequences that the paragraph reproaches to it’;
Thirdly:
‘it is demanded that there should be an acknowledgement, in writing, of the depredations exercised on our trade by the English and French privateers’;
Fourthly:
‘the Government of France, faithful to the profession of public faith, which it has made not to intermeddle in the internal affairs of foreign governments with which it is at peace, would look upon this paragraph as an attack upon its loyalty, if this was intended by the President. It demands, in consequence, a formal declaration that it is not the Government of France, nor its agents, that this paragraph meant to designate’;
And finally, that:
‘in consideration of these reparations, the French Republic is disposed to renew with the United States of America a treaty which shall place them reciprocally in the same state that they were in 1778. By this new treaty, France shall be placed, with respect to the United States, exactly on the same footing as they stand with England, in virtue of the last treaty which has been concluded between them. A secret article of this new treaty would be a loan to be made by the United States to the French Republic’.
Mr. Y continued that:
‘I will not disguise from you, that this satisfaction being made, the essential part of the treaty remains to be adjusted; you must pay money, you must pay a great deal of money … These propositions, he said, being considered as the admitted basis of the proposed treaty, M. Talleyrand trusted that, by his influence with the Directory, he could prevail on the Government to receive us’.
On the 21st, the commissioners again met with Mr. X and Mr. Y, who:
‘represented to us, that we were not yet acknowledged or received; that the Directory were so exasperated against the United States, as to have come to a determination to demand from us, previous to our reception, those disavowals, reparations and explanations, which were stated at large last evening … that if we satisfied the Directory in these particulars, a letter would be written to us to demand the extent of our powers, and to know whether we were authorized to place them precisely on the same footing with England; whether, he said, our full powers were really and substantially full powers; or … only illusory powers’.
The commissioners replied that:
‘our powers respecting a treaty are ample; but the proposition of a loan … is not within the limits of our instructions … that our powers were such as authorized us to place France on equal ground with England, in any respects in which an equality might be supposed to exist at present between them, to the disadvantage of France … the constitution of the United States authorized and required our President to communicate his ideas on the affairs of the nation; that, in obedience to the constitution, he had done so; that we had not power to confirm or invalidate any part of the President’s speech; that such an attempt could produce no other effect than to make us ridiculous to the government and to the citizens at large of the United States; and to produce, on the part of the President, an immediate disavowal and recall of us as his agents.’
On the 27th, they again met Mr. X, who said that:
‘the Directory were becoming impatient, and would take a decided course with regard to America, if we could not soften them.’
He again:
‘expatiated on the power and violence of France: he urged the danger of our situation, and pressed the policy of softening them, and of thereby obtaining time ... Mr. X again returned to the subject of money: Said he, gentlemen, you do not speak to the point; it is money: it is expected that you will offer money’.
They replied that:
‘it is no; no; not a sixpence.’
Mr. X then:
‘again called our attention to the dangers which threatened our country, and asked if it would not be prudent, though we might not make a loan to the nation, to interest an influential friend in our favor. He said we ought to consider what men we had to treat with; that they disregarded the justice of our claims and the reasoning with which we might support them; that they disregarded their own colonies, and considered themselves as perfectly invulnerable with respect to us; that we could only acquire an interest among them by a judicious application of money.’
They replied that:
‘the conduct of the French Government was such as to leave us much reason to fear, that should we give the money, it would effect no good purpose, and would not produce a just mode of thinking with respect to us … but the Directory could decide on the issue of our negotiation. It had only to order, that no more American vessels should be seized, and to direct those now in custody to be restored, and there could no opposition to the order ... The conversation continued for nearly two hours; and the public and private advance of money was pressed and re-pressed in a variety of forms.’
Mr. Z (Lucien Hauteval, a wealthy West India sugar planter who had to flee from Santo Domingo in 1792), met with Gerry to inform the commissioners that:
Talleyrand ‘had expected to have seen the American ministers frequently in their private capacities; and to have conferred with them individually on the objects of their mission.’
The commissioners all met with Mr. Z and:
‘General Pinckney and General Marshall expressed their opinions, that not being acquainted with M. Talleyrand, they could not, with propriety, call on him; but that according to the custom of France, he might expect this of Mr. Gerry, from a previous acquaintance in America.’
On October 28th, Gerry met with Mr. Z and Talleyrand, who said that:
‘the Directory had passed an arret, which he offered for perusal, in which they had demanded of the envoys an explanation of some parts, and a reparation for others, of the President’s speech to Congress, of the 16th of May last; he was sensible, he said, that difficulties would exist on the part of the envoys relative to this demand; but that by their offering money, he thought he could prevent the effect of the arret … but that this matter about the money must be settled directly, without sending to America.’
The next day, October 29th, Mr. X again called, and said that:
‘Talleyrand was extremely anxious to be of service to us, and had requested that one more effort should be made to induce us to enable him to be so. A great deal of the same conversation which had passed at our former interviews was repeated … the sum of his proposition was, that if we would pay, by way of fees, (that was his expression) the sum of money demanded for private use, the Directory would not receive us: but would permit us to remain at Paris as we now were; and we should be received by M. Talleyrand, until one of us could go to America and consult our Government on the subject of the loan …’
The commissioners replied and:
‘asked him, whether they would suspend further depredations on our commerce? He said they would not … We told him that France has taken violently from America more than 15 millions of dollars, and treated us, in every respect, as enemies, in return for the friendship we had manifested to her; that we had come to endeavor to restore harmony to the two nations, and to obtain compensation for the injuries our countrymen had sustained; and that in lieu of this compensation, we were told, that if we would pay 12 hundred thousand livres, we might be permitted to remain in Paris …’
‘War was made upon us so far as France could make it in the present state of things; and that it was not even proposed, that on receiving our money this war should cease; we had no reason to believe that a possible benefit could result from it; and we desired him to say that we would not give a shilling, unless American property unjustly captured was previously restored, and further hostilities suspended … He said that without this money we should be obliged to quit Paris; and that we ought to consider the consequences: the property of Americans would be confiscated, and their vessels in port embargoed.’
The next morning, October 30th, Mr. X and Mr. Y met with the commissioners again and the subject was resumed.
‘Mr. Y spoke without interruption for near an hour … that his (Talleyrand’s) situation had been very materially changed by the peace with the Emperor … Mr. Y then called our attention to our own situation, and to the force France was capable of bringing to bear upon us … Perhaps, said he, you believe that, in returning and exposing to your countrymen the unreasonableness of the demands of this government, you will unite them in their resistance to those demands; you are mistaken; you ought to know that the diplomatic skill of France, and the means she possesses in your country, are sufficient to enable her, with the French party in America, to throw the blame which will attend the rupture of the negotiations on the federalists, as you term yourselves, but on the British party, as France terms you; and you may assure yourselves this will be done.’
On November 1st, the commissioners met and:
‘it was at length agreed that we should hold no more indirect intercourse with the government’.
On November 3rd, Mr. X called again to say that Mr. Y wished to meet, but he was informed by the commissioners that:
‘we considered it as degrading our country to carry on further such an indirect intercourse as we had for some time submitted to, and had determined to receive no propositions, unless the persons who bore them had acknowledged authority to treat with us’.
Mr. X added that:
‘M. Talleyrand was preparing a memorial to be sent out to the United States, complaining of us as being unfriendly to an accommodation with France.’
The commissioners replied that:
‘it would not be easy for him to convince our countrymen that the statements we should make were untrue … and we trusted we should be supported by the great body of candid and honest men. In this conversation we again stated, that America had taken a neutral position; that she had faithfully sought to preserve it; that a loan of money to one of the belligerent powers was directly to take part in the war; and that to take part in the war against her own judgement and will, under the coercion of France, was to surrender our independence’.
Further, in a third dispatch written to Pickering on November 27th, the commissioners would inform him that on November 11th, the commissioners transmitted an official letter to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, that since their meeting on October 8th, they were told that:
‘a report on American affairs was then preparing, and would in a few days be laid before the Directory, whose decision thereon should, without delay, be made known, has hitherto imposed silence on them … They have not yet received it; and so much time has been permitted to elapse … that they can no longer dispense with the duty of soliciting your attention to their mission.’
The commissioners then stated their mission – that:
‘the President of the United States has given it in charge to the (commissioners) to state to the Executive Directory the deep regret he feels at the loss or suspension of the harmony and friendly intercourse which subsisted between the two republics, and his sincere wish to restore them; to discuss candidly the complaints of France, and to offer frankly those of the United States. And he has authorized a review of existing treaties, and such alterations thereof as shall consist with the mutual interest and satisfaction of the contracting parties’.
The commissioners wrote to Pickering that:
they ‘have not, however, hitherto received any official intimation relative to this business; we are not yet received; and the condemnation of our vessels, for want of a role d’equipage, is unremittingly continued. Frequent and urgent attempts have been made to inveigle us again into negotiations with persons not officially authorized, of which the obtaining of money is the basis: but we have persisted in declining to have any further communication relative to diplomatic business with persons of that description; and we mean to adhere to this determination. We are sorry to inform you that the present disposition of the Government of this country appears to be as unfriendly towards us as ever, and that we have little prospect of succeeding in our mission’.
In a fourth dispatch to Pickering, written on December 24th, the commissioners wrote that:
they ‘have not yet received any answer to our official letter … but reiterated attempts have been made to engage us in negotiation with persons not officially authorized … We are all of opinion that, if we were to remain here for six months longer, without we were to stipulate the payment of money, and a great deal of it, in some shape or other, we should not be able to effectuate the objects of our mission, should we be even officially received; unless the projected attempt on England was to fail, or a total change take place in the persons who at present direct the affairs of this government’.
They related an offer made to them on December 17th by Mr. Y, who had observed that Marshall had been the advocate for Beaumarchais ‘in his cause against the State of Virginia’; and stated that:
‘M. de Beaumarchais had consented, provided his claim could be established, to sacrifice 50,000 pounds sterling of it, as the private gratification which had been required of us; so that the gratification might be made without any actual loss to the American Government’.
Marshall replied that:
‘no one of us would consent to it, unless it was preceded or accompanied by a full and entire recognition of the claims of our citizens, and a satisfactory arrangement on the objects of our mission’.
Mr. Y then met with Gerry and accompanied him to meet with Talleyrand who made an offer that:
‘understanding that the French republic has 16 millions of Dutch rescriptions to sell, the United States will purchase them at par, and will give her further assistance when in power. The first arrangement being made, the French government will take measures for reimbursing the equitable demands of America arising from prizes, and to give free navigation to their ships in the future’.
On January 8th 1798, the commissioners wrote a fifth dispatch to Pickering concerning a message from the French Directory about a law that was to be passed by the Council of 500:
‘to declare, as good prizes, all neutral ships having on board merchandises and commodities, the production of England, or of the English possessions, that the flag, as they term it, may no longer cover the property. And declaring, further, that the ports of France, except in case of distress, shall be shut against all neutral ships, which, in the course of their voyage, shall have touched at an English port’.
They concluded that:
‘nothing new has occurred since our last, in date of the 24th ultimo. We can only repeat that there exists no hope of our being officially received by this government, or that the objects of our mission will be in any way accomplished’.
Late in the evening on March 4th, the five dispatches that were sent by the commissioners arrived at Philadelphia and delivered to Pickering, who immediately informed President Adams.
The next day, March 5th, President Adams wasted no time and sent the following message to Congress:
‘The first despatches from our envoys extraordinary, since their arrival in Paris, were received at the Secretary of State’s office at a late hour the last evening. They are all in a character which will require some days to be deciphered, except the last, which is dated the 8th of January 1798. The contents of this letter are of so much importance to be immediately made known to Congress, and to the public, especially to the mercantile part of our fellow citizens, that I have thought it my duty to communicate them to both Houses, without loss of time’.
This despatch had contained the message from the French Directory concerning the new law regarding neutral ships.
On March 23rd, Pickering wrote to the American envoys that:
‘the President, therefore, thinks it proper to direct – 1. That if you are in treaty, with persons duly authorized by the Directory, on the subjects of your mission, then you are to remain and expedite the completion of the treaty … and if you shall have discovered a clear design to procrastinate, you are to break off the negotiation, demand your passports, and return … 2. That if, on the receipt of this letter, you shall not have been received, or, whether received or not, if you shall not be in a treaty with persons duly authorized by the Directory, with full and equal powers, you are to demand your passports and return.’
[next week - chapter 7 - The Publication of the ‘XYZ Affair’ Despatches, April 19th 1798]
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